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The Concept of Pariṇāma in Indian Philosophy

–A Critical Study with Reference to Sāṁkhya-Yoga–

Kolla Chenchulakshmi

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Dedicated to My Parents
Smt Venkatamma, Kolla
Sri Chenchaiah, Kolla

Introduction

The Sāṁkhya and the Yoga are the two important orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy. Their doctrines could be traced to the earliest available literary sources, the Vedas, which are not only repositories of ancient Indian wisdom, but also constitute a storehouse of all orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy. The Sāṁkhya *Pravacana Sūtra* of Kapila is considered to be the oldest account of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. But its systematic presentation is to be found in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, which is known for its brevity, clarity and depth. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself gives the name of the persons who were responsible for the origin and development of this school of philosophy. From his account in his Sāṁkhya Kārikā LXX,

etat pavitram agryam munir āsuraye 'nukampaya pradadau |
āsurir api pañcaśikhāya, tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantraṃ ||

we learn that the tenets of this school were first passed on in compassion to his disciple Āsuri by the sage Kapila, the founder of the school, who was considered the first among the wise (*ādividvān*). Doubts have been expressed about the historicity of Kapila. He is considered more a mythological figure than an historical person (Pulinbihari Chakravarti, Origin and Development *of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, p.112.). Āsuri is said to have passed on the doctine of Sāṁkhya to Pañcaśikha, who elaborated

it. Doubts have been current on the authenticity of the *Sāṁkhya Sūtras*. However, the earliest authentic systematic exposition available of the Classical Sāṁkhya is found in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattva Kaumudī*, Aniruddha's *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Vṛtti* and Vijñāna Bhikṣu's *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*. They constitute important and authentic works on the Sāṁkhya philosophy.

The Yoga as a systematic exposition of a school of philosophy is traced to the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali. Vyāsa's lucid and masterly commentary on the *Yoga Sūtra*'s known as *Yoga Bhāṣya* is an authoritative work on the Yoga system. Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Yoga Bhāṣya* known as *Tattva Vaiśāradī* is a masterpiece of philosophical exegesis and style. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's Yoga *Vārttika* is another important work of the Yoga tradition.

A unique feature of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system is its rationalist temper, its reliance on reason in developing its doctrines. Only such things as cannot be accounted for by perception and inference are accepted on the strength of *Śruti*.

For the purpose of the present study, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga have been taken as allied systems in as much as their position on the doctrines of causation (*satkāryavāda*) and evolution (*pariṇāmavāda*) are the same. The fundamental points of difference between these two schools are indicated. For example, while the Yoga introduces the concept of God over and above the two ultimate principles, namely, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, the Sāṁkhya accepts these two only. Further, minor differences between the two schools in respect of the evolution of different categories are indicated at appropriate places. Although there is no reference in the works of the Sāṁkhya tradition to the three forms of *pariṇāma—dharma*, *lakṣaṇa* and *avasthā*—that figure in the Yoga Sūtra; they are not unacceptable to Sāṁkhya.

In line with the other systems of Indian philosophical tradition, the Sāṁkhya also originated in man's endeavour to redeem himself from suffering, from the cycle of birth and rebirth and to

attain the ultimate ideal of life. This is evident in the following *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* I,

duḥkha-trayā-' bhighātāj jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau |
dṛṣṭe sā 'pārthā cen nai 'kāntā-' tyantato-' bhāvāt ||

But this ideal cannot be achieved without the requisite philosophic wisdom. Knowledge and ethical perfection constitute the two wings for the soul in its spiritual flight. Knowledge comprises the insight into the Sāṁkhya-Yoga categories and ethical perfection refers to the code of conduct that the aspirant has to adhere to in his day-to-day life.

Īśvara Kṛṣṇa announces in the very first *kārikā* of his treatise *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* his objective in undertaking to write a work of this kind. He says that he wants to show a way out of the threefold pain that men are subject to in their mundane existence, by providing the discriminative knowledge that *Puruṣa* is different from *Prakṛti*. The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* II runs thus,

dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ, sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣayā-' tiśaya-yuktaḥ |
tadviparītaḥ śreyān vyaktā-'vyakta-jña-vijñānāt ||

This discriminative knowledge (*viveka-jñāna*) is based on our knowledge of the Sāṁkhya- Yoga doctrines regarding the nature of *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti* and their relation, God, theory of causation, evolution, categories of evolution and so on.

The present study centres round one of the important tenets of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga school, namely, its theory of causation. Although the discussion of the various doctrines and problems of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga has to take place in the context of the realisation of the ultimate ideal, namely, *kaivalya*, every issue figuring in it has been analysed and discussed thoroughly. Among the various issues which have received a good deal of attention are its theory of causation which came to be known as the doctrine of pre-exis-

tent effects (*satkāryavāda*) and the theory of evolution (*pariṇāma-vāda*). The entire metaphysical structure of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy is rooted in these doctrines according to which there is no production of the non-existent and destruction of the existent.

Causation constitutes the central doctrine in the Indian philosophical systems. The issue over which the systems are sharply divided is, whether the effect is pre-figured in its material cause even before its production or whether it is a new entity that begins to be, having not existed before under the impact of the efficient causes. To put the same in a different form—whether the effect is different from its material cause or non-different from it. The followers of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga are firmly committed to the view that the effect is pre-figured in its material cause even before its production and hence, it is non-different from it; whereas the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold a diametrically opposite view that there are no traces of the effects in their material (inherent) causes and hence, they are totally different from them. The two schools are sharply divided on this issue and they are so much convinced about their respective stands that they are never tired of adducing any number of arguments in defence of their respective positions. The reason for such rigid postures on their part is quite understandable, for any concession shown in this regard would not only mean a defeat, but giving up one's metaphysical standpoint altogether.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga in conformity with its doctrine of pre-existent effects traces everything material right from the subtle *mahat* to the gross physical objects to one primordial principle, namely, *Prakṛti*. It believes that all products are contained implicitly in the bosom of *Prakṛti* and production accordingly would mean merely a transition of an effect from its implicit to an explicit state (*pariṇāma*). This is perfectly in tune with its doctrine of pre-existent effects (*satkāryavāda*). To give up *satkārya-vāda* or to show any concession in this regard would mean giving up its

metaphysical position and unconsciously walking into the traps of its opponent.

So is it with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, the followers of which in conformity with their doctrine of the origin of non-existent effects, believe that the ultimate building blocks of the world of matter are many and not one. They are the atoms of earth, water fire and air. Experience discloses to us that the products of these atomic composition are different from the atoms which have produced them. Hence, the effects have to be construed as non-existent before their production and therefore are to be viewed as different from their respective material (inherent) causes. Production, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is an instance of the many (atoms or parts) giving rise to the one (whole) and not the one *Prakṛti* becoming many as in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. The one is not a development (*pariṇāma*) of the many atoms but a creation (*āraṁbha*) according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Impressed by the differences between cause and effect, the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have no alternative except to adhere to the doctrine of non-existent effects (*asatkāryavāda*), whereas the followers of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga committed to the logic that we cannot account for non-existents are forced to accept the doctrine of pre-existent effects (*satkāryavāda*).

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga *pariṇāmavāda* is an inevitable outcome of its doctrine of pre-existent effects (*satkāryavāda*). *Pariṇāma* as understood by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga means different things. Firstly, it stands for 'change', the dynamic nature of *Prakṛti* which pulsates with activity as against the static nature of atoms as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Secondly, it stands for the change within the primordial *Prakṛti* in its state of equilibrium as when *sattva* changes into *sattva, rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. This is the same as *sarūpa-pariṇāma*. Thirdly, it stands for the change of a thing from its subtle state to its gross state as when *Prakṛti* changes into *mahat*, *mahat* into *ahaṁkāra* and so on till the evolution of the five gross elements. This is the same as *virūpa-*

pariṇāma which is marked by the increase in the grossness of the evolutes compared with the evolvents. Fourthly, it stands for the change of a thing from one state to another as when a leaf undergoes a change of its colour from green to yellow or when clay changes from its state of lump into that of a jar or a pot . There is one thing common for all these forms of change, namely, they do not bring about anything new. *Pariṇāmavāda* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga therefore, does not permit the origin or production of anything new. It is totally opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the production of the new (*āraṁbhavādā*). There are schools which do subscribe to the doctrine of *pariṇāma* such as the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Jainism. But the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma* differs from their's; for whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Jainism understand *pariṇāma* as involving a change wherein the substance remains the same, but its form to be different (i.e. they believe that the form is not pre-figured in its material cause and hence new). The Sāṁkhya-Yoga believes that the form is also not new, since it is also pre-figured in its material cause.

The doctrine of *satkārya* and *pariṇāma* have generated a lot of controversy among the different schools of Indian Philosophy and there is a need to throw light on these issues.

This book is organised in five chapters :

The first chapter, *Sāṁkhya-Yoga Metaphysics*, gives an account of the dualism of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. An attempt is made to expound the Sāṁkhya account of the nature of *Prakṛti* and*Puruṣa* and the arguments that have been advanced by the system in support of their existence. The Yoga view of God and His role in evolution is also discussed. The role of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, the constitutive aspects of *Prakṛti*, is also discussed.

The second chapter, *Satkāryavāda*, undertakes to explain the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *satkārya* and the arguments of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in defence of the theory. This is followed by a presentation of the Nyāya objections to *Satkāryavāda* and the Sāṁkhya refutation of these objections. This chapter on the whole is a study in comparison of the two contesting theories of causation, namely, *Satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*.

The third chapter, *Pariṇāmavāda*, deals with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga account of *pariṇāma* and different kinds of *pariṇāma*. It is shown that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of evolution is a necessary offshoot of its doctrine of pre-existent effects (*Satkāryavāda*). *Prakṛti* is the primordial material cause of the universe. In and by itself is absolutely unconscious. Opposed to it is the *Puruṣa*, the other ultimate principle which by nature is pure consciousness. On account of its proximity to *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* becomes agitated. This agitation disturbs *Prakṛti's* equilibrium and leads to the evolution of heterogeneous categories. Evolution is nothing but the transition of the unmanifest into the manifest, the implicit into the explicit. The second half of this chapter attempts to give a vivid account of the different kinds of *pariṇāma* as conceived by the allied system Yoga.

The fourth chapter, *Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda,* presents a comparative picture of *Pariṇāmavāda* in the light of the contention of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta that *Satkāryavāda* is not compatible with *Pariṇāmavāda* but it is only with *Vivartavāda*. The concepts of *Pariṇāma* and *Vivarta* are analysed and their differences shown. Then, a thoroughgoing analysis is undertaken to show how *Satkāryavāda* is not compatible with *Pariṇāma* and how it logically culminates in *vivartavāda*.

The fifth chapter presents a critical evaluation of the main results of the thesis.

The methodology adopted in writing this book is analytical and comparative. Since a host of interpreters have already analysed the doctrines of the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga schools, a lot of attention is paid in this study to the history of research on the subject and a critical evaluation of the findings and interpretations is attempted. The present work is also comparative in that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy of change can never be understood in its totality without reference to the contending theories of evolution emanating from rival schools of philosophy—Indian and Western.

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Contents

Abbreviations

ABORI	*Annals of Bandarkar Oriental Research Institute*
AJP	*American Journal of Philosophy*
BCV	*Bandarkar Commemoration Volume*
BG	*Bhagavad Gītā*
BORI	*Bandarkar Oriental Research Institute*
BS	*Brahma Sūtra*
BU	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
GB	*Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya*
GJCV	*Gangānātha Jhā Commemoration Volume*
IHQ	*Indian Historical Quarterly*
IPQ	*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JBORS	*Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*
JGRS	*Journal of Gujarat Research Society*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
JM	*Jayamaṅgalā*
JOR	*Journal of Oriental Research (Madras)*
JPA	*Journal of Philosophical Association*
JPS	*Journal of Philosophical Studies (Philosophy)*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Great Britain and Ireland)*
JSNDTWU	*Journal of the S.N.D.T. Women's University*
JUP	*Journal of the University of Poona (Humanities Section)*
KU	*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*
MB	*Mahābhārata*

Mai.U	*Maitrī Upaniṣad*
Man.U	*Māṇḍūkhya Upaniṣad*
Mun.U	*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*
MV	*Māṭhara Vṛtti*
NB	*Nyāya Bhāṣya*
NK	*Nyāya Kandalī*
NKM	*Nyāya Kusumāñjali*
NM	*Nyāya Mañjarī*
NS	*Nyāya Sūtra*
NV	*Nyāya Vārttika*
NVTT	*Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Ṭīkā*
PAS	*Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*
PB	*Prabuddha Bhārata*
PEW	*Philosophy East and West*
POS	*Poona Oriental Series*
RJP	*Research Journal of Philosophy*
RM	*Rāja Mārtāṇḍa on Yoga Sūtras*
Re M	*Review of Metaphysics*
RV	*Ṛg Veda*
SBS	*Śaṅkara on Brahma Sūtras*
SC	*Sāṁkhya Candrikā*
SDS	*Ṣaḍdarśana Saṅgraha*
SK	*Sāṁkhya Kārikā*
SLS	*Siddhānta Leśa Saṅgraha*
SPB	*Saṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*
SPS	*Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra*
SPV	*Sāṁkhya Pravacana Vṛtti*
SPVS	*Sāṁkhya Pravacana Vṛtti Sāra*
ṢS	*Saṁkṣepa Śārīraka*
ŚTK	*Sāṁkhya Tattva Kaumudī*
SU	*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*
TPWSBS	*The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Studies*
TRM	*The Review of Metaphysics*

UUJ	*Utkal University Journal (Humanities)*
VP	*Vedānta Paribhāṣā*
VPS	*Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*
VS	*Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*
YB	*Yoga Bhāṣya*
YD	*Yukti Dīpikā*
YS	*Yoga Sūtras*
YV	*Yoga Vārttika*

CHAPTER I

Sāṁkhya-Yoga Metaphysics

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga acceptance of *Prakṛti* as the ultimate material cause and its theory of evolution (*pariṇāma*) is rooted in its doctrine of pre-existent effects (*Satkāryavāda*). In order to understand the central role played by the doctrine of *satkārya* in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system in all its ramifications, we need to understand its two ultimate reals, namely, *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, and the relation between them.

A philosopher, being an interpreter of life, has always to keep himself in close contact with his experience. Otherwise, he will create a system of dead thoughts, devoid of any touch of life and reality. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga developed its philosophy on the basis of analysis of experience.

According to the Sāṁkhya, there are two fundamental principles lying at the root of experience, namely, *Puruṣa* the subject, the principle of consciousness and *Prakṛti* the principle of matter.[1] They are not mythical in nature but are at the very root of the possibility of knowledge or experience. Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience. But these by themselves are not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness. Unless there is some principle of consciousness, which interprets our experience, objects by themselves are incapable of producing experience. Hence, the need for the principle of consciousness which the Sāṁkhya finds in *Puruṣa*.

Therefore, Sāṁkhya-Yoga logically and experientially leads us to accept the fundamental principles of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. The two principles are, therefore, not dogmatically postulated, but are accepted on the basis of a thorough analysis of experience.

Prakṛti is unconscious, active, mutable and eternal whereas *Puruṣa* is conscious, inactive, immutable and eternal. *Prakṛti* and its evolutes being insentient are objects of knowledge, while *Puruṣa* being sentient is the subject of knowledge. *Puruṣa* also shares some characteristics with *Prakṛti*. Like *Prakṛti*, *Puruṣa* is without a cause, omnipresent, immobile, non-component, non-merging, impartite, independent and eternal.[2] But, whereas *Prakṛti* is eternal and mutable (*pariṇāmīnitya*), *Purusa* is eternal and immutable (*kūṭasthanitya*).

Prakṛti,[3] the root cause of all material things in the universe, is called the unmanifest (*avyakta*)[4] and the primordial principle (*Pradhāna*). *Pradhāna*[5] is the term regularly used in the *Yoga Sūtras* of Patañjali.[6] It is also used in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*[7] which specially teaches Yoga. The earliest occurrence of the term '*Prakṛti*' is in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*,[8] where '*Prakṛti*' evidently denominates *Avyakta*. The indisputable occurrences of the term are to be found in the *Mahābhārata*[9] and in Vasiṣtha's and Yājñavalkya's systems.[10] The *Bhagavad Gītā*,[11] uses the word frequently. Kṛṣṇa describes his eight-fold *Apara-Prakṛti*, as consisting of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas* and the great elements, while his *Para-Prakṛti* is said to be *jīvabhūta*. The *Mahābhārata* refers[12] to the eight *Prakṛtis* and terms them as '*Avyakta*', '*Para-Prakṛti*'.

It may also be noted that the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* in the *Ṛg Veda* suggests the existence of undifferentiated original cause of the universe which resembles the Sāmkhya-Yoga description of *Prakṛti*. The *Brahma Sūtras*[14] suggest that the followers of the Sāmkhya-Yoga made an effort to find out reference to their concept of *Prakṛti* in '*sat*'. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[15] describes '*aja*' which is more akin to the Sāmkhya-Yoga concept of *Prakṛti*. This *Upaniṣad* uses the terms *Akṣara*,[16] *Avyakta*[17] and *Pradhāna*[18] also.

The basis for the personal concept of *Puruṣa*[19] is indicated in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *Ṛg Veda*.[20] The unattached and invisible nature of souls as free from material qualities is indicated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[21] *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,[22] *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*[23] and *Maitrī Upaniṣad*.[24]

1.1. PRAKṚTI

1.1.1. Nature of Prakṛti

Prakṛti is one, root-less root of the Universe with the three attributes and evolving through these every kind of entity save the *Puruṣa*.[25] (On other hand the products or the evolutes of *Prakṛti* are caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive , mobile, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct and heterogeneous.[26]) *Prakṛti* is uncaused (*ahetumat*) eternal (*nityam*), all-pervasive (*vyāpi*), immobile (*niṣkriyam*), single (*ekam*), independent (*anāśritam*), unmerged (*aliṅgam*), non-conjunctive (*viyuktam*) and homogeneous (*sajātīya*). The evolved is composed of the three constituents (*guṇas*), non-discriminated (*aviveki*), objective (*viṣayaḥ*), general (*sāmanyam*), non-intelligent (*acetanam*) and productive (*prasavadharmi*); so is the unevolved (*Prakṛti*). The *Puruṣa* though similar, is (*yet*) the reverse of these.[27] The *Puruṣa* is similar to (1) *Prakṛti* in its eternality and uncausedness and to (2) the products of *Prakṛti* in its plurality. But, inspite of these similarities to *Prakṛti* and its products, it is essentially different from them in that it is conscious and it is not subject to changes.

While *Prakṛti* is one, the products of *Prakṛti* are many.[28] While *Prakṛti* is self-subsistent and independent, the individual effects are sub-ordinate to *Prakṛti*. Unlike *Prakṛti* its products take their shelter in cause.[29]

After explaining the dissimilarities between the manifest and the unmanifest, Īśvara Kṛṣṇa mentions the similarities between these two. The three *guṇas* of pleasure, pain and delusion are to

be found in both the manifest and the unmanifest. The products are non-different from *Pradhāna*. In the view of Vācaspati Miśra, the evolutes starting from the great principle (*mahat*) cannot be distinguished from *Prakṛti*, being connate with it. There is also another reason for holding the evolved and the unevolved as non-discriminated. None of the effects functions by itself. As given in the *kārikā* X of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, all the evolved are dependent throughout on the unevolved (*Prakṛti*) for their sustenance and functioning. Thus, no evolute functions by itself. This is marked by the use of the word '*aviveki*'. '*Aviveki*' may stand for 'non-separableness', i.e. for the character of being co-operative; among the manifest things, there is none that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence, it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself.[30]

With the above knowledge of the difference and similarity between *Prakṛti* and its products, the nature and the characteristics of *Prakṛti* can be well-exemplified. Thus, it is known that *Prakṛti* is uncaused, eternal and all-pervading. In its equilibriated state (*avyakta*) motion and change also take place. *Sattva* changes into *sattva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. But they never change into something else. *Prakṛti* is one and is the unity of the three *guṇas* in a state of equilibrium. Being the cause of all, it supports all, but itself is not supported by anything else. It is also partless, since in this state, the production of different evolutes does not commence. It is independent, non-manifested and unconscious, and is also the objective ground of all cognitions. It is not limited to individual consciousness, but enters into the knowledge of all. The most important characteristic of *Prakṛti* is that it is productive of the manifold products of the world.

Does *Prakṛti* then stand for the theistic God? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic *māyā*? Is it all these, or none other than these? It cannot be God, since it is said to be without intelligence (*acetana*). It resembles the Vedāntic *māyā* in as much as it is at the root of the manifold material objects in the universe.

1.1.2. Proofs for the Existence of Prakṛti

Prakṛti cannot be an object of perception because it is too subtle to be so. But it can be inferred from its effects. The sensory and the motor organs, and all the material objects around us are its effects. Committed to the view that nothing can come out of nothing, the Sāṁkhya traces the diverse products of the world to *Prakṛti*, the primordial material cause of the world.

The Sāṁkhya offers the following five proofs in support of the existence of *Prakṛti*.[31] *Prakṛti* exists,

1. Because of the finite nature of specific objects (*bhedānām parimāṇatvāt*),
2. Because of the homogeneous nature (*samanvayāt*) of the effects,
3. Because of its function (evolution) being due to the efficiency (energy) of the cause (*saktitaḥ pravṛttes' ca*),
4. Because of the separation between cause and its product (*kāraṇakārya-vibhāgāt*) and
5. Because of the merging of the whole world (of effects) (*avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya*).

1. In the first argument, '*parimāṇāt*' stands for '*parimitatvāt*' meaning because of 'being measured', i.e. 'being finite'. The reasoning assumes an asyllogistic form. The products in the manifest world being finite are dependent on their causes in which they exist in an unmanifest condition. The limited objects ultimately must have a cause which is unlimited, independent, unconditional and infinite which the Sāṁkhya finds in an unmanifest *Prakṛti*. For instance, objects like pots and other things are found to have clay for their cause, in which they exist in an unmanifest form. Clay and such other causes also being finite, they also depend on their material causes in which they are supposed to be present in an unmanifest state.

In this way, we are logically led on to the acceptance of an infinite cause which will not depend on any other cause and in which all finite objects of the world exist in an unmanifest form. The Sāṁkhya finds in *Prakṛti* this infinite, independent material cause which constitutes the ultimate material cause of everything in this world.

2. The second argument to prove the existence of *Prakṛti* is based on the homogeneous nature of effects (*samanvayāt*). All the effects (evolutes) like *mahat*, etc., are seen uniformly to be in possession of the three *guṇas* (*samanvayāt*), namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is the firm conviction of Sāṁkhya that according to its theory of *satkārya* the effect cannot be different from its cause. If the effects (evolutes) like *mahat* etc. possess *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, there must be a common source for the three *guṇas*. The Sāṁkhya believes that this common source for the products manifesting *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the Universe is the same as *Prakṛti*, the composite of the three *guṇas*.
3. The third argument in defence of the existence of *Prakṛti* rests on the principle of efficiency of the cause for the evolution of effects (*saktitaḥ pravṛtteśca*). It is a well-known feature of causation that the functioning of a cause is dependent on its potentiality. It produces only what it is capable of producing. The cause of the evolved must contain the potentiality of the unevolved. And this can only be *Prakṛti*. *Mahat* too is caused by that which has the unevolved potentiality of *mahat*, that is, by the *Pradhāna*. Therefore, Vācaspati Miśra observes that energy refers to the effect existing in the cause which is substance-potentiality.[32] This logic leads us to the supposition of an ultimate cause which has the energy to produce everything which is the same as *Prakṛti*.

4,5. The fourth and fifth arguments in support of the existence of *Prakṛti* are based on the principle that the effects get separated (*vibhāgāt*) from their respective causes at the time of creation (*sṛṣṭi*) and again get resolved (*avibhāgāt*) into them at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*). This process of the manifestation of effect from cause and the resolution of effect into its cause is comparable to a tortoise extending and withdrawing its limbs.[33] The effect is not non-existent prior to causal operation, but only non-manifest like the limbs of a tortoise hidden in its shell.

It is, therefore, clear that there is one primordial source for the material objects of the world in which they exist in an unmanifest form prior to evolution and simply get stretched out from the primordial principle like the limbs of the tortoise (when it stretches them out) and again get resolved into it at the time of dissolution like the limbs of the tortoise (when it withdraws them into its shell). This primordial principle from which the effects get separated, i.e., become manifest (*vibhāgāt*) and into which they get resolved, i.e., become unmanifest (*avibhāgāt*) is the same as *Prakṛti*.

These arguments in defence of the existence of *Prakṛti* depend upon the acceptance of *satkārya* view of causality. Vācaspati Miśra also mentions this clearly in his commentary saying that in order to establish the existence of *Prakṛti*, first we must accept the existence of the effect in its cause even before its causal operation.

1.2. PURUṢA

1.2.1. Nature of Purṣa

Puruṣa or the principle of consciousness is another ultimate reality accepted by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in addition to *Prakṛti*. The term *Puruṣa* has been chosen by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga to refer to the self, the principle of immutable consciousness. *Prakṛti*, as we have

seen already, stands for the principle of change. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is of the view that change can never be intelligible unless it is viewed against the background of something permanent. The search of this background brings the Sāṁkhya-Yoga to the conception of *Puruṣa*.[34] According to it the self thus arrived at is absolutely different from all material things, gross and subtle. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga infers the unchanging character of *Puruṣa* from the fact of its being the uninterrupted knower.

In its nature *Puruṣa* is the opposite of *Prakṛti* and its evolutes. *Prakṛti* and its evolutes, being composed of the three *guṇas*, are designated as the non-sentient, objects of knowledge, while *Puruṣa* is the sentient subject of knowledge.[35] *Puruṣa* resembles *Prakṛti* in being omnipresent (*vyāpi*), immobile (*niṣkriyaṃ*), non-composite (*viyoga*) non-merging (*aliṅgam*), impartite (*avibhājya*) and eternal (*nityam*).[36]

Puruṣa transcends causality. It is of the nature of pure consciousness.[37] It is non-objective and sentient.[38] Being untouched by the *guṇas* (*rajas*) of *Prakṛti*, it is inactive. But it appears to be active due to its contact with *buddhi*.[39] Gauḍapāda[40] and māṭhara[41] clarify the apparent activity *of Puruṣa* with the following example. As a *brāhmaṇa*, who is taken along by thieves with them, is suspected to be a thief; *Puruṣa*, even though inactive by nature, is mistaken to be an agent on account of its contact with the agent.

How the originally isolated *Puruṣa* who is a mere witness comes to appear like the knower and experiencer, is a crucial problem in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. *Puruṣa* knows and experiences objects through the modifications of *buddhi* when he takes the activities of *buddhi* as his own just as a king takes the victory or defeat of soldiers to be his own.[42]

1.2.2. Proofs for the Existence of Puruṣa

The *Sāṁkhya*[43] offers the following proofs for the existence of *Puruṣa*.

The existence of *Puruṣa* as a distinct reality apart from matter has to be accepted because,

1. Collocations serve the purpose of something other than themselves (*saṅghātaparārthatvāt*),
2. The other must be the reverse of what is composed of the three constituents (*triguṇādiviparyayāt*),
3. There must be control of the collocations (*adhiṣṭhānāt*),
4. There must be an enjoyer (*bhoktṛbhāvāt*), and
5. There is activity for the purpose of release from the three-fold misery (*kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca*).

1. It is held that composite objects exist for the sake of *Puruṣa*. The body, the senses, the mind and the intellect are all means to realise the end of *Puruṣa*. Whatever is composite serves the purpose of some being other than itself, as for instance, a bed or a cot. The grouping is purposive. The purpose is not that of the aggregate as such but of another, i.e., other than the aggregate. This other is the same as Spirit. But one might contend that one collocation may serve the purpose of another collocation and hence, this other need not be a spiritual entity. But such a supposition leads to infinite regress, for that other collocation would itself serve the purpose of another, and so on endlessly. Hence, this 'other' must itself be other than the material aggregate and it is the same as the Spirit (*Puruṣa*).
2. The second proof for the existence of *Puruṣa* is as follows: The material objects are non-intelligent (*acetana*), non-discriminating (*aviveki*), objects of knowledge (*viṣaya*). Therefore, they presuppose something which is intelligent (*sacetana*), discriminating (*viveka*) and subject of knowledge (*jñātṛ*), devoid of the three *guṇas*. All objects composed of the three *gunas* being the products of

Prakṛti (which is devoid of intelligence), need an intelligent principle to guide them.

3. The third proof for the existence of *Puruṣa* is based on the ground that the intelligent *Puruṣa* is to be accepted as the controller of the non-intelligent collocations (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of *Prakṛti*. The products of *Prakṛti* being inert require to be controlled and directed by an intelligent agent just as the non-intelligent chariot moves under the guidance and control of an intelligent charioteer. Hence, the existence of an intelligent *Puruṣa* must be accepted.
4. The fourth argument seeks to prove the existence of *Puruṣa* on the basis of its *bhoktṛbhāvatva*. According to the Sāṁkhya, the different things in the world which are products of *Prakṛti* comprising the three *guṇas*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, present the agreeable and disagreeable features, namely, of pleasure, pain and delusion. But to whom are they agreeable or disagreeable? Who is to experience (*bhogya*)? Experience presupposes the subject of experience or experiencer (*bhoktṛ*). The Sāṁkhya insists that the experiencer or enjoyer cannot be *buddhi* or any other product of *Prakṛti*, since they themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The point is that the ultimate experiencer or enjoyer must be other than that which comprises the three *guṇas* and this other is the same as *Puruṣa*.
5. The last argument for the existence of *Puruṣa* is based on the activity for the purpose of release of the *Puruṣa* (*kaivalyārtham pravṛttes'ca*). The term *kaivalya*, according to both Vācaspati Miśra[44] and Vijñāna Bhikṣu[45] means complete dissociation from pain. According to them, the attainment of *kaivalya* in this form is not possible for the evolutes of *Prakṛti* starting from *buddhi* and ending in gross matter like physical bodies. Freedom from pain for these evolutes means separation from their own nature, which is impossible. Hence, arises the necessity for some entity different from them. Had no such entity been recognised, it would have been meaningless for the sages to have striven for *kaivalya*. All *śāstric* injunctions for the effort towards *kaivalya* would have been equally meaningless. This entity for the liberation for which the sages had striven is the same as *Puruṣa*. Hence, *Puruṣa* must be accepted to exist.

According to the *Yukti Dīpikā*,[46] striving for *kaivalya* is an act on the part of *Pradhāna*. Activity constitutes the nature of *Pradhāna*, as it develops into forms, while *Puruṣa* does not evolve into forms. A striving for the cessation of all activities on the part of one whose very nature is activity, appears very strange and cannot be accounted for unless we accept something other than *Pradhāna* for whose purpose this striving is made. The author of the Yukti Dīpikā observes that *Puruṣa* stands for this something outside *Pradhāna*. *Puruṣa* constitutes the purpose behind *Pradhāna*'s striving for *kaivalya*.[47]

1.2.3. Plurality of Puruṣas

The plurality of *Puruṣas* is sought to be established on the basis of differences in the incidence of birth and death, differences in the endowment of the instruments of cognition and action and also the differences in the actions pursued by different persons.[48]

If there is only one Soul (*Puruṣa*), birth of one should lead to the birth of all and similarly of death which is not the case. Firstly, the fact that different persons are seen to be born and die at different times shows that the *Puruṣas* cannot be one but many. Secondly, if *Puruṣa* is one, blindness or deafness of one will lead to the blindness or deafness of all.[49] But the fact that different persons are endowed with different sense organs is an indication that *Puruṣa* is not one, but many. Thirdly, if there is only one *Puruṣa*, it

follows that a certain action on the part of one (person) should lead to the same activity on the part of others which is not the case. The differences in action on the part of different persons lead us to the conclusion that *Puruṣas* are many.[50]

1.3. GOD

The most conspicuous difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga is the acceptance of God (*Īśvara*) as an independent reality by Yoga in addition to *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Patañjali is supposed to have made Sāṁkhya theistic by grafting the concept of God. Mādhavācārya describes Patañjali as the founder of the theistic Sāṁkhya (*seśvarasāṁkhya-pravartaka*).[51] The *Sāṁkhya kārikā* does not mention God. Vācaspati Miśra,[52] finds logical incongruity in the belief in the existence of God. The *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*[53] criticises the existence of God (*Īśvara*). Vijñāna Bhiṣku[54] thinks that the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* does not disprove God (*Īśvara*) but negates the proofs for His existence. However, he holds that *Īśvara* serves no purpose in the Sāṁkhya system. Patañjali accepts God (*Īśvara*) as an independent reality in addition to *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*.

1.3.1. Nature of God

Patañjali describes God (*Īśvara*) as unique self (*Puruṣa-viśeṣa*), untouched by afflictions, actions, fruits and dispositions.[55] He accepts God as an object of meditation (*dhyāna*) and as one who removes the obstacles coming in the way of concentration.[56] Vyāsa makes the Yoga God *saguṇa* (qualified) by introducing the idea of mercy for creatures.[57] God as accepted by Patañjali and supposed by Vyāsa is not the efficient cause of the evolution of *Prakṛti*. But Vācaspati Miśra[58] holds that God disturbs the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* and enables it to evolve into the manifold objects of the Universe. But as an efficient cause, His role is not

active. In this sense He does not move *Prakṛti* to evolve, but He eliminates the obstacles standing in the way of evolution of *Prakṛti*. His role in the evolution of *Prakṛti* resembles the role of a peasant who waters lower fields by removing the barriers from higher fields full of water. God removes obstacles to the transformation of *Prakṛti* into various modes without energising it into activity. God is, therefore, considered as the inactive efficient cause of the evolution of *Prakṛti*.[59] Why does he remove obstacles and pave the way in the evolution of *Prakṛti*?

The answer is, for the enjoyment and release of the *Puruṣas*. Both, Vijñāna Bhikṣu and Vācaspati Miśra hold that *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the world and God is its efficient cause.

God is eternally free and transcends the law of *karma*. He is omniscient and omnipotent and omnipresent. He is embodiment of perfection. He is the teacher of the saints (*ṛṣis*) and the teacher of the Veda[60]—"*aum*" is His symbol.

1.3.2. Proofs for the Existence of God

The proofs advanced by Yoga for the existence of God are as follows:

1. The *Vedas* tell us that God exists.[61]
2. The law of continuity leads us to accept that there must be the highest limit of knowledge and perfection which is God.[62]
3. God should be supposed to exist, for otherwise, we cannot account for the association and dissociation of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.[63]
4. As one who facilitates concentration of the mind by arresting its fluctuations and thereby liberation. God must be supposed to exist.[64]

1. The *Vedas* pronounce the existence of God as the Supreme Self who is also the ultimate reality and the final goal of the world. The scriptures are authoritative (for being creations of God), they cannot deceive us. Vyasa argues that there is a beginningless relation (*anādi saṁbandha*) between the *Vedas* and the pre-eminence of God.[65]
2. Vyāsa applies the law of continuity to Power (*śakti*) and lordship (*aiśvarya*). The different degrees of Power and lordship point to the existence of the Perfect Power and highest Lord. God is the embodiment of the greatest Power, unequalled and unsurpassed (*saṁyatiśayavinirmukta*). If there were a more powerful being than God, He would be the highest Lord. If there were another equally powerful Lord, there will be conflict and clash of desires and purposes between them, and a consequent chaos in the world. So, there is only supreme God.
3. Evolution of the world is due to the association (*saṁyoga*) of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*, and its involution is due to the dissociation (*viyoga*) of one from the other. *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* being two incompatible realities cannot associate themselves with each other on their own. Nor are they naturally dissociated, because it would make their relation inexplicable. So, there must be an intelligent cause which effects their association and dissociation.
   Their association and dissociation cannot be accounted for without the will of God.[66] Although God has no end of His own to achieve, compassion for creatures (*bhūtānugraha*) is the end of evolution and involution which depend upon association and dissociation of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣas,* God brings about their association and dissociation.[67]
4. Devotion to God is the sure means for effecting concentration of the mind by arresting its fluctuations. Devotion to Lord eliminates obstacles to Yoga[68] and enables the mind to attain concentration (*samādhi*) and liberation (*mokṣa*).[69] The grace of God is recognised.[70] God, therefore must exist, as an object of concentration. Hence, God must exist.

However, our concern with God in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of causation is only in the context of the explanation of evolution and dissolution of *Prakṛti*. We have seen how the Sāṁkhya, in the absence of God, failed to offer a satisfactory explanation in the starting of the evolution of *Prakṛti*. But as is obvious from the above analysis, Yoga by accepting God has overcome the difficulties of Sāṁkhya. From our point of view we are not concerned whether Yoga's conception of God is satisfactory or not, but we are convinced that Yoga does avoid the difficulties of Sāṁkhya and offers an intelligible explanation for the starting of evolution of *Prakṛti*.

1.4. GUṆAS

Prakṛti is the name given to the three *guṇas*,[71] namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in a state of equilibrium. The *guṇa* theory is the most distinguishing characteristic of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system. According to this theory, all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world are combinations in different proportions of the three ultimate reals which are technically known as *guṇas*. The conception of these *guṇas* arose in the minds of thinkers, undoubtedly as a result of their analysis of phenomenal consciousness and its objects.

Our worldly experience discloses that everything in the Universe possesses a three-fold aspect. The world presents the features of brightness or illumination, activity or change and inertia or enveloping nature. It must have derived these characteristics from its cause, because according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, we cannot conceive of anything in the effect which is not found in the

cause. Therefore, the principles underlying our experience as bright, active and inert must be traced to an ultimate source, namely, *Prakṛti*.

These features which are of the nature of brightness, change or activity and inertness are derived through the presence of the principles known respectively as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in *Prakṛti*.[72] They are the constitutive elements of *Prakṛti*. They are not parts of *Prakṛti*, but identical with it, since the Sāṁkhya-Yoga holds that *Prakṛti* is opposite of anything constituted of parts.[73] They are called *guṇas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they serve the purpose of the other (*Puruṣa*) or because they are inter-twined like the three strands of a rope which binds *Puruṣa* to the world.[74] Thus, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the three *guṇas* which are responsible for all the experiences of *Puruṣa*. They are objective, ultimate and the irreducible elements of experience. The '*sattva*' element makes objects intelligible, the *rajas* element enables objects to undergo changes, *tamas* enables the object to assume shape and resists its destruction through changes.

The *guṇas* are not the so-called qualities of the Vaiśeṣika system because, they themselves possess the characteristics of lightness, movement and heaviness.[75] One quality cannot be the substratum for another. So, these *guṇas* are substances (*dravyas*), since the qualities of lightness etc. subsist in them.[76] All objects of the world (both physical and mental) are the results of the different permutations and combinations of these three ultimate reals. Our thoughts and ideas (which seem to possess a character different from that of the physical world) are not outside the realm of the *guṇas*. They are as much the effects or modifications of the ultimate reals as physical things. The only difference lies in the fact that in the mental sphere, the element of *sattva* predominates, whereas in the sphere of the physical universe, *tamoguṇa* becomes the dominating element. *Tamoguṇa* is present in all our ideas of objects. Otherwise, these mental products could not assume the forms of their objects in order to make the experience of an individual possible. In every *citta-vṛtti*, the indistinguishable union of

guṇas is detectable. Our phenomenal consciousness as well as its objects are due to the functioning of these three *guṇas* which are the sole productive forces of this Universe.

However, our experience includes not only a cognitive aspect but also a feeling aspect. From the point of view of knowledge, these three *guṇas*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are known as bright, mobile and inert, whereas from the point of view of feeling, they appear as pleasure, pain and delusion.[77] The co-existence of these three constituents is observed even in everyday experience. This can be exemplified by a well-known illustration adduced by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[78] A's wife is beautiful, and well-endowed with all the qualities of head and heart that are requisite in an ideal wife. These constitute the *sattva* element in her. Because of this, she causes A, her husband, to rejoice. But she is the cause of jealousy in her co-wives B and C, and despair in her neighbour D who could not have the good fortune to be married to her. Jealousy is *rājasa* and despair is *tāmasa*. These are due to the elements of *rajas* and *tamas* in A's wife. They become active only in respect of the co-wives or the neighbour. A lovely woman is not merely an assemblage of ideas in some minds (as is held by the idealistic philosophers). Nor is she absolutely different from thoughts or feelings (as ordinarily held by the realistic philosophers). Thus, the correspondence between the inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily explained by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers on the hypothesis that they represent two allied lines of development from a common source (i.e., the three *guṇas*).

The *guṇas* are related to one another in a peculiar manner. They are mutually subjugative, supporting, productive and co-operative.[79] Dominance of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* results in the dominance of virtue, vice and ignorance repectively as it is observed in the case of Gods, men and beasts which abound in *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* respectively.[80] Each *guṇa* suppresses the other two to become manifest with its own characteristics or to perform its specific standing with the support of each other.[81]

Though the *guṇas* possess contradictory characteristics, yet they act in co-operation with each other to accomplish a single purpose, i.e. the emancipation of *Puruṣa*, just as a wick and oil, opposed to fire by nature, co-operate when in contact with the single purpose of giving light,[82] just as wind, bile and phlegm, though possessing contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body.[83]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga *Prakṛti* with its three *guṇas*, its theory of evolution of the gross objects of the world from the primordial *Prakṛti* are so designed as to be in conformity with the principle of conservation of energy.[84] According to this principle, the total energy of any body or a system of bodies can only be transformed from one state to another and can never be increased or decreased or made to disappear. The total energy of the universe remains the same in all its states of change.

When, for instance, the primordial cause, namely *Prakṛti*, evolves into the gross objects of the world through a series of intermediary changes, *Prakṛti* merely changes from its subtle to gross state, there is neither destruction of *Prakṛti* nor increase, nor decrease in it in terms of quantity. It merely changes from one state to another leading to increase in its grossness. Similarly at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) when all the gross objects of the world merge into the primordial *Prakṛti* through the intermediary stages, there is no destruction of the gross bodies; they merely lapse into their state of subtlety from their state of grossness. It is on this principle that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga assumption of *Prakṛti* as the ultimate material cause is based. It is for this reason that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga accepts the doctrine of *satkārya* according to which there is no origination for the non-existent and destruction for the existent. Causation is merely a transition of an entity from its unmanifest to the manifest state, from its subtle to its gross state. Similarly, destruction is not annihilation, but only a transition from its manifest to its unmanifest state. This theory (*pariṇāma*)

is based on the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of satkārya. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. However, Yoga accepts a third category, viz., God.
2. *hetumat, anityam, avyāpi,*
   sakriyam anekam āśritam, liṅgam |
   sāvayavam paratantram
   vyaktam, viparītam avyaktam || SK.x.
   See also Gerald James Larson, 'An Eccentic Ghost in the Machine: Formal and Quantitative Aspects of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga Dualism', PEW. Vol.XXXIII, No.3, July 1983, p. 231.
3. The word '*prakṛti*' is derived from the root '*kṛ*' by the addition of the prefix '*pra*' and the noun-formative suffix '*ktic*'. Accordingly it stands for 'that from which things be produced'.
4. '*Avyakta*' is a negative compound — '*a* + *vyakta*'. '*Vyakta*' is derived from the root '*añj*' — 'to manifest', 'be visible', by having the prefix '*vi*' and the noun-formative suffix 'kta'. Hence, it means, to become visible or evolved. Thus, *vyakta* is a product and *avyakta* is its opposite, viz., the cause or the unevolved.
5. The word '*pradhāna*' is composed of the prefix '*pra*', the root 'dha' (to place or set before, to deliver) and the suffix '*ana*'. It means the 'originator', the 'primary germ'. Hence, it is used in the sense of the original source of the visible or material world. It is synonymous with *Prakṛti*.
6. *tato manojavitvaṁ vikaraṇabhāvaḥ pradhānajayaśca* | YS. III.48.
7. Mai. U.VI.10.
8. *māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyat māyinaṁ tu maheśvaraṃ* |
   tasyāvayavairbhūtastu vyāptaṁ sarvamidaṁ jagat ||
   SU. IV.10.
9. M.B.XII.198.12-16, etc.
10. *Ibid.* XII. 129.41. |
11. *bhūmir āpo'nalo vāyuḥ khaṁ mano buddhir eva ca* |

ahaṁkāra itī'yaṁ me bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhā | |
apare'yam itas tv'anyāṁ prakṛtiṁ viddhi me parāṁ |
jīvabhūtāṁ mahābāho yaye'dam dhāryate jagat | | BG.VII.4, 5.

12. *etāḥ prakṛtayatvyaṣṭau* | M.B. XII.294-29.
13. *na asat āsīt no sat āsīt tadānīm* |
na āsīt rajaḥ no vyomā paroh yat | |
kim āvarīvaḥ kuha kasya śarman |
ambhaḥ kim āsīt gahanaṁ gabhīram | | RV.X.129.1.
See also K.K. Bhatnagar, 'The Origin of the Universe—Science and the Vedas', PB, Vol. XCVI, July 1991, p.228.
14. BS.I.1.5-11.
15. *aja1mekāṁ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām* |
bahviḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānāṁ sarūpāḥ | | SU.IV.5.
16. *saṁyuktametat kṣaramakṣaraṁ ca* |
vyaktāvyaktam bharate viśvamīśaḥ | | *Ibid*.I.8.
17. *Ibid*.
18. *kṣaram pradhānamamṛtākṣaraṁ haraḥ* |
kṣarātmānāvīśate deva ekaḥ | | *Ibid*.I.10.
19. The word '*Puruṣa*' (*puru sete iti puruṣaḥ*) is derived from a compound of the noun '*pura*' and the nominal derivative from the verb '*si*' 'to sleep', by adding the suffix '*a*'.
In the *Ṛg Veda* the word '*puruṣa*' is used to refer to the primeaval man who is the soul and the original source of the Universe. In the *Atharva Veda* it is used in the sense of the personal and animating principle in men and other being. In the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, it is used to refer to the Supreme Being. In the Sāṁkhya philosophy, it is used in the sense of 'the Spirit as passive spectator of *Prakṛti*.'
20. *sahaśraśirṣāḥ puruṣaḥ sahaśrākṣaḥ sahaśrapat* |
sa bhūmīm viśvato vṛtvā tyatiṣṭat dṛśāngulam | | RV.X.90.1.
21. BU.IV.iii.15.
22. *aśabdam asparśam arūpam avyayam* |
tathārasaṁ nityamagandha vacca yat |
nicāyya tam mṛtyu-mukhāt pramucyate | | KU.I.iii.15.
23. Mun.U.III.3.

24. Mai.U.III.3.
25. STK.Int. p.28.
26. S.K.X.
27. S.K.XI.
28. MV.X.
29. SK, MV, GB SC.X.
30. STK.XI.
31. *bedānām parimāṇāt*,
samanvayāt, śaktitaḥ pravṛtteśca |
kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād
avibhāgād viaśvarūpyasya | |
SK.XV.See SPS, SPV, SPB, I. 129-132.
Also see Bijayananda Kar, *Indian Philosophy: An Analytical Study*, pp.86-92.
32. STK.XV.
33. *prasāryeha yathāṅgāni kūrmaḥ saṁharate punaḥ* | MB.XII.239.4.
34. SPB.I.66.
35. SK.XI.
36. SK.X.
37. MV.XIX.
38. STK.XIX.
39. GB.XX.
40. *Ibid*.
41. MV.XX.
42. STK.LXII.
43. *saṅghātaparārthatvāt*,
triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt |
puruṣo'sti, bhoktṛbhāvāt,
kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca | |
SK.XVII. See SPS, SPV, SPB.I.140-144.
See also Bijayananda Kar, 'An Examination of the Sāṁkhya Arguments for the Existence of Puruṣa', IPQ, Vol.II,1974, pp.253-259.
44. STK.XVII.
45. SPB.I.144.

46. YD.p.97.
47. However, ascription of appellations like 'striving' to the *Prakṛti* does not cohere with its materiality.
48. SPS, SPV, SPB.I.149; SK, STK. XVIII.
49. GB.XVIII.
50. *Ibid.*
51. SDS. p.266.
52. STK.LVII.
53. SPS.I.92-94.
54. SPB.I.92.
55. *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa Īśvaraḥ* | YS.I.24.
56. *tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo' pyantarāyābhāveśca* | YS.I.29
57. YB.I.2.3.
58. YS.IV.3. TV.IV.3.
59. *nimittam aprayojakaṁ prakṛtīnāṁ varṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat* | YS.IV.3.
60. *sa purveśaṁpi guruḥ* |
61. YB.I.24.
62. YS, RM.I.25.
63. RM.I.25.
64. YS, YB.I.25.
65. YB.I.24.
66. YB.IV.23.
67. RM.I.26.
68. YS, TV.I.32.
69. YB, TV, YV.I.23.
70. YB.I.23,25.
71. '*Guṇa*' in Sanskrit has three meanings, *viz.*,1. quality, 2. rope and 3. not primary.
72. SK.XIII.
73. *prīty-aprīti-viṣāda'-tmakāḥ,*
prakāśa-pravṛtti-niyamārthāḥ |
anyonyā- 'bhibhavā-śraya-
janana-mithuna-vṛttayaśca guṇāḥ || SK.XII.

74. SPB.I.61., STK.XII.
75. SPB.I.61.
76. SPVS.I.61.
77. SPB.I.127., SK.XII.
78. SK.XII. (Notes there on)
79. *Ibid.*XII.
80. JM.XII.
81. STK.XII.
82. *sattvam laghu prakāśakam*
iṣṭam upaṣṭaṁbhakam calam ca rajaḥ |
guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ,
pradīpavac cā'rthato vṛttiḥ || SK.XIII.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *tam yajñam barhiṣi praukṣan puruṣam jātamagrataḥ*
tena devāḥ ayajanta sādhāḥ ṛṣayaḥ ca ye | R.V.X.90.7.
See K.K. Bhatnagar, 'The Origin of the Universe—Science and the Vedas', PB, Vol.XCVI, July 1991,p.289.
And also Hari Sankar Prasad, 'Time and Change in Sāṁkhya-Yoga', IPQ', Vol.XII,1984, pp.41,42.

CHAPTER II

Satkāryavāda

In Indian Philosophy, *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and *asatkāryavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be considered as the two principal theories with reference to which other Indian theories of causation may be conveniently formulated. The relation between the material cause and the effect is the point of dispute between these two theories of causation.

In Western Philosophy, the treatment of causation mainly centres round the efficient cause and the material cause is either by and large neglected or assigned only a secondary importance. But the situation is entirely different in the Indian treatment of causation. In Indian thought, though the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is accepted as one of the causes, it does not form the subject-matter for any serious discussion. On the other hand, it is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and its relation to the effect that constitutes an important issue for consideration in Indian Philosophy. The principal questions raised are: Where does the effect derive its essence from? Does the material cause impart to its effect or is it external to the effect so far as the essence concerned? Is the effect created out of nothing? What happens to the cause when the effect comes into existence? Is it annihilated altogether or does it continue to exist alongside of the effect? Does the material cause itself actually get transformed into its effect or does it remain the same constituting a substratum for the effect to

originate and inhere in or does it present itself as an effect which is only an appearance? We propose to discuss these issues in this chapter.

There are only two possibilities with regard to the essence of an effect: either it derives its essence from its cause or it does not. If it derives its essence from its cause, it means that it is non-different from its cause. If the essence of an effect is not derived from its cause, it means that the effect is different from its cause. This is the basis for the division of the Indian theories of causation into two broad kinds—*satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*. *Satkāryavāda* maintains that the effect is existent in the cause in a latent or potential form and it becomes patent or manifest in the course of causal operation. *Astkāryavāda*, on the other hand, maintains that the effect is completely non-existent before the causal process, and that it is completely a new entity not only with regard to its form but also in respect of its content. It does not drive its essence from its cause.

The main exponents of *satkāryavāda* are the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, and of *asatkāryavāda* are the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism. Each of these two principal theories of causation lends itself to two different interpretations in respect of the production of effect. On the basis of this difference, *satkāryavāda* is further divided into the *pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, and the *vivartavāda* of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta. Similarly *asatkāryavāda* is divided into *ārambhavāda*, which is advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and *pratītya-samutpāda-vāda* which is subscribed to by Buddhism.[1] There is a middle course between the two chief theories, which can be called *sadasatkārya-Vāda*, and it is advocated by Jainism and the Madhva School of Vedānta.

The *Nāsadīya-Sūkta* of *Ṛg Veda*[2] indicates the pre-existence of effect in its cause. The production of '*sat*' from '*asat*' suggests a causal connection between *vyakta* and '*avyakta*'. The idea that the effect is non-different from its cause is suggested in the *Chāndogya*

Upaniṣad.[3] The same idea is found in the *Bhagavad Gīta*[4] when it says: 'of the non-existent there is no coming to be; of the existent there is no ceasing to be'. Thus, we can trace the germs of *satkāryavāda* in the ancient speculations which have been brought together and elaborated into a coherent theory by the different schools of Indian Philosophy.

2.1. SĀṀKHYA ARGUMENTS FOR SATKĀRYAVĀDA

According to Kapila,[5] there cannot be production of something out of nothing; that which is not, cannot be developed into that which is. The production of what does not already exist (potentially) is impossible like the horn of a man; because there must be a material out of which a product is developed, and because everything cannot occur every where and at all times; and because anything possible must be produced from something competent to produce it. Kapila supports *satkāryavāda* in several of his aphorisms.[6]

All these views of the Sāṁkhya are succinctly brought under five conceptual schemes by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in his *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*. The Sāṁkhya reasons for its theory of pre-xistent effects are embodied in kārikā IX.[7] Īśvara Kṛṣṇa observes that the effect must be supposed to exist in its material cause even before its production, because

1. that which is non-existent cannot be brought into existence (*asadakaraṇāt*),
2. every production requires an appropriate material cause (*upādānagrahaṇāt*),
3. everything is not possible everywhere and always (*sarvasaṁbhavābhāvāt*),
4. the potent cause can produce only that for which it is potent (*śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt*),

5. cause and effect are identical (*kāraṇa-bhāvāt*). These are five reasons of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa may be considered in detail.

1. The first argument in favour of *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is that if the effect were really non-existent, no agency whatsoever could bring into existence.[8] Gauḍapāda,[9] commenting on this, says that we do not see that production of a non-existent object, as oil cannot be produced from sand (wherein oil is non-existent). Since, only an existent object can be produced, the effect does exist even before its production. Vācaspati Miśra[10] asserts that even a thousand artists cannot turn blue into yellow. Effectuation is nothing but manifestation of the unmanifest effect. The manifestation of something existent is compatible with experience also, e.g., by compression of the seeds of sesamum there is the manifestation of oil, by pounding paddy there is the manifestation of rice and by milking the cow there is the manifestation of milk. These instances clearly show that the effect exists prior to the operation of the cause. It is existent in the cause in a latent or unmanifest condition. On the other hand, there is no instance where we find that something non-existent is produced. In fact, what is non-existent is never seen to be produced. There is no production of what is non-existent like the horn of a man.[11]
2. It is also seen that who wishes to produce a particular effect seeks the appropriate material cause for it, e.g., one who wants curd seeks milk and not water. This *restriction in search* for certain causes alone for certain effects clearly shows that the effect sought in that material cause is already pre-figured in it. This is the sense in which Gauḍapāda understands *upādāna-grahaṇāt*. Vācaspati Miśra,[12] prefers to interpret it as meaning 'be-

cause of relatedness to the material cause'. It is thought that a particular effect which is related to a certain material cause alone is seen to be produced from that material cause. For instance, oil is related to oil-seeds and hence oil is produced from oil-seeds alone; oil is not related to water and hence it is not produced from water. If the effect is non-existent prior to causal operation, the relation of certain effects to certain material causes as stated above cannot be established, and hence we cannot explain why we search for certain material causes alone when we want to produce certain effects. The fact that we search for certain material causes for certain effects is enough to show that certain effects are related to certain causes even before their production, which means the pre-existent effect cannot be related to its material cause.

It is difficult to choose between the two modes of understanding *upādāna-grahaṇat*. Gauḍapāda's argument has the merit of being the simpler and more lucid of the two; but it has the disadvantage that the same idea is repeated in *śakya-karaṇāt* (4th argument).

3. It is also a matter of our experience that everything is not produced from anything.[13] Only certain causes such as milk and yarn are seen to produce such effects as curd and cloth repectively. This *restrtiction in production* suggests that the causes from which the effects are seen to be produced contain the effects even before their production and they cannot be produced from things such as clay and wood in which they are not contained.

Although the second and the third arguments of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa look identical, in fact they are not. Both are designed to establish the pre-existence of effect but on different gounds. The second argument establishes the pre-existence of an effect on the basis of *restriction in our*

search for certain effects in certain causes, whereas the third argument proves it on the basis of *restriction in production* of certain effects from certain causes.

4. Particular effects are produced only from particular causes, because of the varying potencies of the latter. The effect exists in its cause prior to its production because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent of cause such possibilities manifest.[14] That power or potentiality is nothing but the not yet come to our view or undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent can produce the effect that is capable of being produced by it; production of a non-entity cannot take place.

So mateiral causality is nothing but possession of the power to become the effect. But does this potency belongs to that which has potency? Or that which is devoid of this potency? If the potency belongs to that which is devoid of this potency, then there would be the production of a water pot from yarn leading to the absurdity of anything being produced from anything. If it belongs to that which has potency, i.e., residing in the potent cause, is it operative on all effects or upon that effect only for which it has potency, i.e., residing in the potent cause, operative on all effects or upon that effect only for which it is potent? If it is operative on all effects, the same state of non-restriction will arise; this is operative only upon that for which it is potent, then it is to be explained as to how it can operate upon a non-existent effect. If it is said that the particular potency is itself of the sort that it produces only certain effects, not all, then it may be asked; 'Is this particular potency related to the effect or not'? In the former case, the relation cannot be with a non-existent effect and thus, the existence of effect shall have to be admitted. In the latter, the same restriction will come

in. Hence, the effect shall have to be admitted as existent.[15] In other words, the cause cannot have the potency for the effect unless the effect is already present in the cause in the form of potency (*śakti*).

5. The existence of the effect prior to the operation of the cause, is established by the fact that the effect is non-different from the cause (*kāraṇa-bhāvāt*).[16] The effect being identical with its cause, the existence of the cause implies the existence of the effect and there can be no identity between an entity and a non-entity.

Production is manifestation (*āvirbhāva*). Destruction is disappearance (*tirobhāva*). Production is evolution. Destruction is involution. For example, gold is transformed into ornaments and ornaments are melted back into gold. Similarly, clay is transformed into jars and jars are powdered into clay. There is neither creation of the non-existent nor destruction of the existent.[17] This view is supported by the *Gītā* which says, 'There is no creation of the non-existent, there is no destruction of the existent.'[18] So, production is not creation of a non-existent entity, but manifestation of a pre-existent latent effect. The maxim, 'something can never come out of nothing' sums up the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of causation.

Gauḍapāda[19] says that the effect is of the same nature as of its cause, e.g., rice (is produced) from paddy. If the effect were not existent in the cause, then rice could be produced from *kodravas*;[20] and since it is not so, the effect must be considered to be existent even before its production.

Vācaspati Miśra,[21] following the *Yukti Dipika*,[22] goes a step further and adduces the following reasons to establish the identity of cause and effect :

1. Effect is not different from its material cause, since it is a property (*dharma*) of the cause which belongs to it. A piece of cloth is not different from the yarn it is made of, because it is the property of the yarn. An object different in essence from another object can never be its property or attribute. A cow being different from a house, it can never be the property of the horse. The cloth belongs to the yarn as its property (*dharma*).
2. There is a causal relation between the yarn and cloth. They are not different objects because the yarn is the material cause of the cloth and there is a relation of the constituent and the constituted between them. Causal relation cannot subsist between entities which are essentially different, such as clay and cow.
3. Two objects which are different in their very essence can be conjoined as a pool and a tree, and disjoined like the Himalayas and the Vindhyas. The yarn and cloth are not different so as to be in the relation 'conjunction' (*saṁyoga*) and 'disjunction' (*viyoga*). Since, there is neither 'conjunction' nor 'disjunction' between them; they are not two different objects.[23]
4. The material cause and the effect are non-different, since they are quantitatively identical. Yarn and cloth are not different, since the cloth does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of threads constituting it. An object different from another object always has a weight different from the weight of the other. For example, the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing ten grams is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing two grams. But we find quantitative equivalence between yarn and cloth. This proves that the effect, cloth, is not different from its cause, the yarn.[24]

In view of the reasons adduced above, cause and effect are accepted as non-different. The identity of cause and effect having

been admitted, the existence of the cause implies the existence of the effect, which means that the effect is already existent before the causal operation.

2.2. ASATHKĀRYAVĀDA OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

According to the Nyāya,[25] an effect is a new creation (*ārambha*). It is non-existent in its material cause and produced anew out of its material cause. The effect is defined as the counter-entity of its antecedent non-existence (*prāgābhāva-pratiyogi*).[26] It means that the effect leaps into existence by putting an end to its previous non-existence. To illustrate, the effect table does not exist in any form in the wood before it is produced. It emerges from a state of non-existence into a state of existence. Antecedent non-existence (*prāgābhāva*) has no beginning but has an end. When the effect comes into being, it does so by putting an end to its antecedent non-existence. Again, the effect is essentially different from its material cause. A pot, for example, has a character which its constituent parts, the two halves, do not have. The whole (effect) has a character of its own, though it is related to its parts (cause) in an inseparable way. The pot can be used to fetch water but the two pot-halves by themeselves do not have that function. It is true that apart from the pot-halves the pot has no existence but it is also true that it is something over and above them. Curd is non-existent in milk, but it is produced from milk owing to the disintegration of parts and a fresh collocation of its parts.[27] The particles of milk endowed with a particular smell and a particular taste produce curd with a particular smell and taste due to the peculiarity produced by heating (*pākaja-viśeṣa*). Likewise, a sprout is produced from a seed owing to the rearrangment of its atoms due to heat. They produce first a peculiarity (*atiśaya*) in the shape of the first swollen condition, then an intermediate swelling and then the last peculiarity in the shape of germination.

2.3. NYĀYA CRITICISM AND SĀṀKHYA DEFENCE OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga has met with scathing criticism at the hands of the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The earliest text of the Vaiśeṣika's, namely, the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda, does not refer to the Sāṁkhya -Yoga. Praśastapāda primarily aims at explaining the philosophical thought contained in the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda and his interest does not extend to the examination of the other systems. Commentators of the *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, like Udayana and Śrīdhara, undertake the task of refuting the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine which are opposed to their system. The *Sūtras* of Gautama[28] provide only hints for a criticism of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of the existence of effect in its cause prior to its production. Vātsyāyana received much doctrinal background from his predecessors. Hence, he has ample scope to refute the theories of other systems.

Let us turn to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refutation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of pre-existent effects. Śrīdhara, in his *Nyāya Kandalī*, poses the question: if even before the operation of the cause the cloth is existent in the yarn, why is it not perceived even though all the conditions required for perception (i.e., its material cause, the organs of vision and light, etc.) are present and there is also the desire to see it? Entities such as tables and chairs, pots and cloth are perceptible when they exist, and become imperceptible once they are destroyed. When such perceptible objects are not perceived it is reasonable to conclude that they are non-existent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that the cloth, being a perceptible phenomenon, does not exist in the yarn, since it is not perceived (in the yarn) prior to its production even though our visual senses are in good condition and other conditions also are satisfied.[29] But the Sāṁkhya-Yoga contends that the existence of the effect can be ascertained through *anumāna*, though it is not amenable to perception and there is no reason to deny the existence of an object, if it can be ascertained by inference.[30] But

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[31] counters this argument and asks, if the effect (cloth) exists in the cause (yarn), in what form does it exist ? Does it exist on the loom in the form of the cloth fit enough to be worn by a person? If the cloth exists in that form, then the causal operation expected to be undertaken to produce it from the yarn becomes superfluous. If it be argued that the causal operation is necessary despite the presence of the effect in the cause in the same form in which it is present at the end of causal operation, then where is the end for such a causal operation? The fact that an object exists implies that there is no need of causal operation to bring it into existence, and if one still persists on the need for a causal operation to bring an entity that already exists into existence, it is bound to land us in the anomaly of endless causal operations.[32] The only way to overcome this difficulty is to admit the non-existence of the effect. However, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga sticks to its doctrine of pre-existent effects, with necessary modifications. It argues that the cloth does exist in the yarn not in the form in which it is fit enough to be worn by an individual but in the form of the yarn, thereby causal operation does not become superfluous as it is necessary to transform the yarn into the cloth. However, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is not convinced of the merits of this new attempt on the part of Sāṁkhya-Yoga to sustain its doctrine of pre-existent effects. He considers that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempt is in fact vindicative of the spirit of *asatkāryavāda*. To say that the cloth as such is not existent in the yarn but is existent in the form of a hank of yarn, amounts to admitting that the cloth produced after the causal operation is not the same as the cloth present in the form of a hank of yarn. And this position is in no way different from that of *asatkāryavāda*.[33]

The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (ix.i.1) lays down that an effect, in consequence of the non-assertion of action and attributes to it, is non-existent prior to its production. Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Upaskāra* on the above *sūtra*, adds: If the effects, the jar, etc., were existent before their production, they would be affirmed to possess ac-

tions and qualities; in the case of a jar already produced, such affirmations are made as that the jar is at rest, or in motion, or seems to be coloured. There is no such assertion, antecedent to its production. It is therefore, inferred that it is non-existent before production.[34]

Gautama, the author of *Nyāya Sūtras*, refers to three views prevailing during his period on the relation between cause and effect. They are: (1) before its production the effect cannot be said to be either non-existent, or (2) existent, or (3) both existent and non-existent. In his commentary on the above, Vātsyāyana[35] elucidates the opponent's position as follows: an object is non-existent before its production, because there is a specific rule concerning the material cause (of every effect). The specific rule is: for the production of each particular effect some particular material only is to be obtained, and not anything and everything. if the effect be non-existent (prior to its production), such a specific rule cannot be justified. An effect cannot be existent (before its production), because it is illogical to speak of the production of an effect that exists already. Nor can an effect be both existent and non-existent because, existence and non-existence being absolutely dissimilar in nature contradict each other. After mentioning the views of the opponent, Gautama and Vātsyāyana go to establish their own view that the effect is non-existent (*asat*) prior to its production. To the objection as to why we should accept the non-existence of an effect before its production, Gautama[36] answers by saying that because the production and destruction (of an effect) are actually observed. Origination (*utpādaḥ*) of the non-existent and destruction (*vyayaḥ*) of the existent are a matter of our experience.[37] The words 'origination' and 'destruction' go against the 'transformation' (*pariṇāma*) view, for, 'origination' actually means coming into existence of that which was non-existent and 'destruction' means the going out of existence of that which was existent. It means that the effect is non-existent (*asat*) before its production.

We shall now turn to a consideration of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refutation of the five arguments of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa which form the philosophical basis of *satkāryavāda*.

1. The first argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in support of the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause is that, since what is non-existent cannot be produced; what is produced must be accepted to be existing even before its production. The Naiyāyikas contend that the Sāṁkhya criticism is based on a wrong interpretation of *asatkāryavāda*. There are things of different natures. A sky-flower is absolutely non-existent. Jars and the like are non-existent before they are produced and existent after their production. Hence, there is no absurdity in the doctrine of the production of non-existent effects (*asatkāryavāda*). The followers of *satkāryavāda* allege that the Naiyāyikas court the absurdity of self-contradiction by ascribing the contradictory features, namely, non-existence and existence to one and the same thing. However, Śrīdhara observes that there is no self-contradiction in it, for they are non-existent at one time and existent at another time.

   The most obvious objection to the Sāṁkhya argument, according to the Naiyāyikas, is that it makes no distinction between what is an absolute non-entity (*atyantābhāva*) and what is non-existent before its production (*prāgābhāva*). An absolute non-entity like the hare's horn is, by its very nature, non-existent at all times and is therefore unproducible. An effect, such as the jar produced by a potter is, on the contrary, non-existent only as long as it is not produced. So, it is characterised by both 'non-existence' and 'existence'—'non-existence' before the causal operation, and 'existence' after causal operation. Hence, no contradiction is involved, since the

   contradictory properties (non-existence and existence) characterise the effect successively and not simultaneously.[38]

   The Sāṁkhya makes much of the impossibility of the non-existent. A fictitious entity like the hare's horn, it is argued, can never be produced. But the Naiyāyika replies that a fictitious entity is not produced not because it is non-existent, but because there is no cause for it. That alone is produced which has a cause, and whatever is produced, is found to be non-existent before its production. It is, in fact, no logical criterion to ascertain why only some and not all, non-existent facts become subsequently existent. Therefore, the question why the hare's horn is not produced is absolutely futile.

   Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's[39] reply to this argument of non-production of non-existent entity is different. He says that the Sāṁkhya interpretation of this argument is based upon a wrong understanding of the theory of *asatkārya*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa observes that *asatkāryāvada* does not suggest that anything non-existent including the absolute non-existents such as the sky-lotus (*atyantābhāva*) is produced, but it only means that which is produced is non-existent (*prāgābhāva*).

2. The second argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in support of the prior existence of the effect is based on our dependence on particular material causes for certain effects. Only a particular material is taken for a certain effect to be brought about. Whoever wants to produce oil, thinks of oil seeds. He who wants cloth, searches for yarn and so on. Without the effect being pre-figured in its material cause, the seeking or taking recourse to an appropriate material causes for certain effects to bring about cannot be explained. This appropriate recourse to certain material causes for certain effects cannot be meaningfully

accounted for unless it be on the assumption that the effects are already pre-figured in their material causes.[40] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[41] states the above view of Sāṁkhya thus: If we do not accept the prior existence of the effect in its material cause, causal operation will be without substratum. Our search for a particular cause when we expect a particular effect will be an aimless endeavour, if the prior-existence of the effect in its material cause is not accepted. Thus, our recourse to certain material causes such as milk when we want curd, implies the prior existence of curd in milk, for otherwise we would be engaged in a wild-goose chase.[42]

The Naiyāyikas accept that they too would think of milk and not water when they want to produce curd. But they do not accept the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause. They contend that restriction in our search for certain effects in certain material causes alone could be meaningfully explained without taking recourse to the doctrine of pre-existent effects (*satkāryavāda*) that defies all our efforts to determine the material causes for effects. According to the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the specification of a particular cause for a particular effect is not conclusive to prove the existence of the effect in the cause. Our knowledge that cloth is produced from yarn, for example, does not arise before the production of cloth from yarn.[43] The agent selects a particular cause for a specific effect because he knows its capacity to produce the specific effect through his experience.[44]

While criticising the argument that causal operation will be without substratum, if the effect is not supposed to be existent in the cause, it is said that an agent proceeds to activity only when he knows the causal relation between a particular cause and effect. Knowledge regarding this causal relation is attained through our observation of the activities of elderly person.[45] Moreover, says Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,[46] according to *satkāryavāda*, the rule of taking a particular material for a particular effect (*upādāna-niyama*) will not be tenable because, according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, everything is everywhere. 'There is everything in everything' because, everything is only a particular mixture of three *guṇas* and if obstruction is removed by proper efficient causes, everything can be produced from everything. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that, according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga all effects being transformations of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, there can be no particular cause for particular effect. Any effect can be expected from any cause. Thus, it is *satkāryavāda* that defies all our efforts to determine material cause for effect. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,[47] further remarks in a sarcastic manner: 'It will be very difficult for the poor fellow (the *satkāryavādin*) to perform difficult penance for penitence, because the food he takes becomes dung. Thus (the dung being already existent in food), he will have to go for penitence (again and again) because of eating dung. The fellow, therefore, will be caught up in great difficulty.'

The Naiyāyikas contend that it is ascertained by positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) invariable concomitance that a particular cause is capable of producing a particular effect. That is why a particular cause is selected to get a particular effect.[48] Viśvanātha[49] argues that the weaver undertakes his operation on yarn with the idea that 'cloth shall be produced from yarn' and not that the cloth is pre-figured in the yarn. The *Naiyāyikas*, therefore, contend that we can reasonably explain the practice of people with regard to their search for particular effects in particular causes without accepting the view of the pre-existence of the effects.

The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā also supports *astkāryavāda*. Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstra Dīpikā*[50] observes that a pot is not an object of perception either when it is in the state of clay-lump or in the state of two pot-halves, for otherwise it would contradict the *anupalabdhi*.

The Naiyāyikas seem to rely on experience coupled with their observation of the practice of elders to account for restriction in our search for certain causes for certain effects. But experience being limited, we cannot conclusively argue from the observed particulars to the unobserved all. It is only on the assumption that the effects are pre-figured in their respective material causes that we can offer a satisfactory explanation for restriction in our search for certain material causes for certain effects.

3. Another argument advanced by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in support of *satkāryavāda* is that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. To deny this relation is to court an absurdity that anything may produce anything, i.e., every effect would arise from every cause, which is contrary to our experience. In the absence of a determinate relation between the material cause and the effect, there can be no ground for restricting the causal operation (*kāraṇa-vyāpāra*) to the production of a particular effect. When all effects are equally non-existent and unrelated to the cause, there is no reason why one particular effect rather than another should occur, whatever the cause may be. But this is a flat contradiction of the law of causation. Thus, it must be admitted that a certain cause produces a certain effect because of a necessary relation between the two. And because, any relation is impossible in the absence of either of the relata, the things related as cause and effect must 'exist together'. An existent cause cannot be thought of as having a real relation with a non-existent effect. Hence, the effect must be supposed to be pre-figured in its material cause even before its production.

Adverting to Sāṁkhya-Yoga contention that if you do not accept pre-existence of the effects in their respective material causes, the restriction in production being absent, anything can be produced from everything; Śrīdhara[51] observes that there is no scope for such an anomaly if we understand the causal relation in its proper perspective. We need not have to assume the pre-existence of the effect in order to explain restriction in production. Śrīdhara observes that the competence of cause, 'yarn', is restricted to the effect namely 'cloth' alone. Our experience clearly shows that the competence of certain other class of things such as milk is restricted to the production of certain other class of things such as curd. Causal relation must be understood with reference to the specific universals characterising the particulars. Thus, curd cannot be produced from anything and everything, but from a thing characterised by the specific universal (*Jāti*) 'milkness' (*kṣīratva*) alone. That is to say *kṣīratva* limits the causality of milk (*kṣīra*) to the production of entities characterised by 'curdness' (*dadhitva*). Hence, there is no scope for production of anything from everything even if we do not subscribe to the doctrine of pre-existent effects.

But this argument of the Naiyāyikas with reference to universals also is not of any avail to explain the restriction in production of certain effects from certain causes. That entities characterised by *dadhitva* are produced by entities characterised by *kṣīratva* is also ascertained by empirical experince. Experience being limited, it cannot ensure the uniformity and universality of causality. Further, the universal *kṣīratva* is not a potentiality or power

of the *kṣīra* (milk) that limits its production to *dahi* (curd) but only an epistemic mark or indicator of the fact that things characterised by the universal *kṣīratva* are seen to produce things characterised by *dahitva*. It must therefore be stated here that however much the Naiyāyikas might try, it is not possible to explain the restriction in production without reference to the pre-existence of certain effects in certain material causes.

4. The fourth argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in defence of satkāryavāda is that 'the potent cause can produce only that for which it has power or potency'. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[52] questions: what does the Sāṁkhya-Yoga mean by power (*śakti*)? Is it different from the object manifested (i.e., the effect)? Or identical with it (effect)? If it is different, it means that the effect is different from the power and it leads to the establishment of *asatkāryavāda*. If it is identical with the effect, it leads to the futility of causal operation. But, this is not supported by experience.
   The real nature of power is explained by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa himself. Power, according to him, is the nature (of the effect) characterised by its ability (*yogyata*) and accompanied by the auxiliaries. This power is two-fold: one is existent (*avasthita*) and the other is accidental (*āgantuka*). We always see that an effect is produced by these two powers and thus, one who wants an effect, takes up these two. The 'ability' (*yogyata*) too is not something different from the object. Power itself should not be said to be the effect, since it is established through apprehension that the nature of the effect is different from that of power. Moreover, if we take power itself to be the effect, we have to accept that the effect is produced from the effect, which is absurd. A jar is not produced from a jar.

5. The fifth argument of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in support of the prior existence of effect in its material cause is based upon the non-difference of the cause and the effect.[53]

   The Naiyāyikas raise a series of objections against the above doctrine of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. They contend that the difference between cause and effect is directly perceived. Moreover, if cause and effect are supposed to be identical, the whole world will be identical with its cause, i.e. *Pradhāna* and consequently imperceptible.[54] *Satkāryavāda*, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,[55] cannot be maintained because, the distinct natures of cause and effect are proved by perception. *Asatkāryavādins* argue that no one disputes the fact that curd comes out of milk. We can say that it is milk which produces curd and yet at the same time maintain that curd is not basically the same as milk, but something new and different. Curd is not present in milk prior to its origination. At least the differences between curd and milk indicate that curd is surely a different and new thing.
   We propose to state here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments against the Sāṁkhya doctrine of non-difference of cause and effect and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.

(a) The Naiyāyikas contend that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga argument that the effect is produced in the cause and the effect is destroyed in the cause, involves self-contradiction. The same cause cannot be the abode of two contradictory actions, namely, production and destruction. For example, when a piece of cloth is torn threadbare, it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the yarn. The identity of cloth and yarn would thus mean that the same thing is being destroyed and produced at the same time. Vācaspati Miśra explains away the first objection with the example of tortoise. Just as the tortoise puts out its limbs and draws them in, but does not create or destroy them, so the cause is un-

folded into the effect, and the effect is dissolved into the cause. The tortoise is not different in its states of contracting and expanding limbs. Similarly, particular modifications like jars and crowns, etc. coming out of the same clay and gold, etc., are said to appear or be produced from the latter, and when they lapse into their causal state they are supposed to be destroyed. As a matter of fact there is no 'production' of what is non-existent, nor destruction of what is existent, as declared by Lord Kṛṣṇa.[56]

(b) Cause and effect are objects of different cognitions. We have cognition of a cloth in the form 'this is a cloth'. But we have cognition of the constituent yarn in the form 'this is yarn'. Hence, cause and effect are different.
The followers of Sāṁkhya do not consider that differences in 'cognition' would necessarily lead to difference in the ontological status of an object. For instance, our cognition of 'Rāma' as the son of Daśaratha is different from our cognition of 'Rāma' as the husband of Sīta. But this does not mean that there are two different Rāmas.

(c) Since cause and effect are objects referred to by different words such as 'clay' and 'pot', the Naiyāyikas contend that they are different.
This objection of the Naiyāyikas is answered by the Sāṁkhy-Yoga with the help of the example of a forest consisting of *Tilaka* trees. Just as we speak of '*Tilaka* trees in the forest' though they are not essentially different from each other, so we speak of 'the cloth in the yarn', though they are not essentially different from each other. Though, these are differently called or spoken of by different words, they are not different from each other.

(d) The fourth objection of the Naiyāyikas against the non-difference of cause and effect is as follows: The function or the purpose served (*arthakriya*) by cause is different from that served by effect. For instance, yarn cannot cover a body whereas cloth can. Being different in function, cause and effect are different from each other.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga contends that the difference in function does not prove difference in essence, since a single entity can have different functions. The same fire, for example, can burn, cook food and give light. Each individual bearer performs the function of seeing the path, not that of carrying the *palanquin*, which he does collectively, i.e., in co-operation with other bearers he can carry it. Similarly, the yarn by itself does not serve the purpose of covering, but can do so on combining and taking the form of a cloth.[57]

Vācaspati Miśra[58] urges that the arguments of the Naiyāyikas cannot prove the essential difference between cause and effect. There is an essential identity between them; their difference is accidental due to manifestation and; non-manifestation in one and the same thing.

2.4. EVALUATION OF THE SĀṀKHYA-YOGA AND NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORIES OF CAUSATION

The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are so much convinced about the essential difference between material cause and effect that, they believe that the effect originating from its material cause and resides in it by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). When the effect, cloth is produced from the yarn, the cloth (effect) is supposed to reside in its material cause, namely, yarn by the relation of inherence. It is for this reason that what is usually regarded as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.[59] Accordingly, the yarn constitutes the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* for the ef-

fect cloth; the pot-halves constitute the inherent cause for the effect pot. Hence, even after the emergence of the effect the inherent cause continues to exist, for in its absence the effect lacks a substratum to abide in. Thus when an effect such as cloth is produced, there is not only the cloth but also the yarn wherein the cloth resides by the relation of inherence. The opponent raises an objection. Two things that are essentially different are either conjoined like table and the table-cloth spread on it or disjoined like the Vindhyas and the Himalayas. Since, the cloth and the yarn are neither conjoined nor disjoined, they cannot be considered different.[60] But the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply that the rule of conjunction and disjunction does not hold good in respect of entities in the relation of inherence(*samayāya*). The cloth and the yarn being linked by the relation of inherence, they are neither conjoined nor disjoined. The relation of inherence is so subtle that it is not possible to see things so related as different.

This difference between the material cause and the effect is so fundamental to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that it believes that right from the ultimate material causes, namely, atoms to the final product (*antyavayavin*) continue to reside by the relation of inherence without any loss to their identity. When, for example, a cloth is to be produced, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains the process as follows: two atoms conjoin and produce the effect dyad (*dveṇuka*). Three dyads conjoin and give rise to an effect called triad (*treṇuka*). Four triads combine and give rise to a quartrad (*chaturaṇuka*). Several quartrads combine and produce a filament (*aṁśu*) of cotton. Several filaments of cotton combine and produce a fine fibre. Several fibres combine and constitute a thread. Several threads join together and give rise to a cloth. Here, the atoms constitute the ultimate material cause and the cloth constitutes the final product (*antyavayavin*). The important point to be noticed here is that the cloth (*antyavayavin*) is not really one but a complex of many intermediary causes and effects bound together by the relation of inherence. An intelligent man, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,

discerns the dyads inhering in the atoms; the triads inhering in the dyads, the quartrads inhering in the triads; the filaments of cotton inhering in the quartrads; the fine fibres inhering in the filaments of cotton the yarn residing in the fine fibres by the relation of inherence and finally the cloth residing in the yarn by inherence—all intact without any loss to their identity. This is the miracle performed by the relation of inherence. When two things are related by inherence, the relata do not lose their identity. It is on the basis of this logic that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that when an effect such as cloth is produced from yarn, it remains metaphysically a distinct entity over and above its inherent cause, namely, yarn. Hence, the material cause and the effect are considered different by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The inherent cause (yarn) and the effect (cloth) are objects of distinct congnitions (*jñāna-bheda*). My awareness of 'yarn' is different from my awarenes of 'cloth'. They are characterised by distinct universals (*jāti-bheda*), namely, 'yarnness' (*tantutva*) and clothness' (*paṭatva*). They serve distinct functions (*kārya-bheda*), since the effect 'cloth' serves the function of covering our body whereas the cause 'yarn' does not. They are referred to by distinct names (*nāma-bheda*), namely, 'yarn' and 'cloth'. With all these differences, the material cause and the effect are bound to be essentially different. The fact that they do not look different is only due to the peculiar relation, namely, inherence (*samavāya*) that binds them.

The followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, however, legitimately raise the objection as to how there can be causal relation between things that are essentially different. The objections raised by the Parmanides against change are relevant in this connection. Parmanides holds that if a thing is to change, it has to change into its own self or into something other than itself. If a thing changes into its own self, then the change is not real, for, a thing cannot change into its own self. It cannot change into a thing other than itself. Parmanides, therefore, concludes that change

is unreal. The objections raised by Parmanides against change can be raised against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the production of non-existent effects (*asatkāryavāda*). According to *asatkāryavāda*, the effect being non-existent in its material cause, it must be considered to be essentially different from it. But, then, how can a thing produce something which is essentially different from itself?

The followers of *asatkāryavāda* are not unaware of such difficulties. Referring to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga objection that if effects are not pre-figured in their respective material causes, why should people think of certain material causes such as milk when they want to produce curd or yarn when they want to produce cloth, Viśvanātha, the follower of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, observes that one who is interested in curd will not take to milk by seeing curd in milk but by knowing from his own past experience and also the practice of the elders that curd is produced from milk and not from water, and cloth from yarn and not from sand.

It is true that it has been the practice of people to resort to yarn for cloth, milk for curd, clay for pots. It is also true that this restriction in our search for certain things in certain things alone is not based on our perception of the effects in their respective material causes. But one cannot offer an intelligible explanation for this restriction in our search for certain effects in certain material causes alone and restriction in production such as curd from milk alone and not from water and so on unless we accept some necessary connection between cause and effect. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempts to solve this problem by accepting the pre-existence of the effects in their respective material causes is rather crude and recondite in spite of the fact that it seems to offer an intelligible explanation for the relation between the material cause and the effect. But, if we can construe the Sāṁkhya-Yoga position as a suggestion for necessary connection or the relation of entailment between cause and effect, we do not have any objection to accept its standpoint. A.C. Ewing's remarks are very appropriate here. He observes: 'The view that causation involves logical entailment has often been stated in a radically wrong way. It is often said that the effect must be contained in the cause, or that there must be identity between cause and effect. These statements, taken strictly, are preposterous. The effect cannot be simultaneous; and it cannot be identical with the cause in the proper sense of the word, for otherwise it would not be a different event. Both views would do away with change and so with causation itself.'[61]

To put it in the language of modern epistemology, the relation between cause and effect is *analytic* according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, whereas it is *synthetic* according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The *satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not permit anything new in the effect which is not contained in its cause. The effect cannot contain anything more than its cause. Causation is nothing but a transition from the unmanifest to the manifest, implicit to the explicit, potential to the actual. If an effect is understood as a complex of substance and attributes, both of them are to be traced to its material cause. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga illustrates its conception of the relation between the material cause and the effect by means of the example of the tortoise stretching its limbs out and then withdrawing them into its shell. When the tortoise stretches its limbs out, we do not say that they have emerged from their state of antecedent non-existence. The limbs were already there withdrawn into its shell and are simply made manifest or brought into our view. Similarly, when the tortoise withdraws its limbs into its shell, we do not say that they are annihilated. On the other hand, they have simply disappeared from our view; they are made unmanifest. Hence, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is firmly committed to the Gītā's view that there is no production for the non-existent and destruction for the existent.

It is true that the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga dispense with the notion of novelty in causation, but they have no option, if they are to uphold the notion of necessity between cause and effect. Though the *asatkāryavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika satisfies the requirements of novelty of the effect, it is at the cost of necessary connection between the cause and the effect. The followers of Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika do not accept the pre-existence of the effect in its material cause. They also do not accept the power (śakti) for a particular cause to give rise to a particular effect. In the absence of these two conditions they have to simply rely on experience alone to account for the universality of causation. Confronted with the question as to why people always search for certain effects in certain causes alone such as milk for curd and clay for pots, if the latter are not contained in the former, the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have to find justification by simply appealing to experience. It has been the experience of the elders to take certain material causes when they wanted certain effects. On the basis of this tradition (*vyavahāra*) and on the basis of their own experience, they also think of certain material causes alone for certain effects. But mere experience does not guarantee the universality of causality. The criticism that Hume levels against the causal necessity also holds good against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the relation between the material cause and effect (*asatkāryavāda*), for there is no guarantee that the present will be repeated in the future. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with its commitment to the doctrine of prior non-existent effects (*asatkāryavāda*) can never offer a convincing explanation for the universality of causation.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga explains necessity but it cannot account for novelty in the effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains novelty but it cannot account for necessity between the cause and the effect. The point is that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga has no obligation to expain the novelty of the effect, for its commitment to *satkāryavāda* does not permit any novelty and it does not regret it. The fact is that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga offers the most convincing explanation for the universality of causal relation.

The theory of causation of any given system is based on its conception of the relation between properties (*dharma*) and substance (*dharmi*). The basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is the theory of *dharma-dharmi-bheda*, i.e., the essential difference between the substrate and its properties.The cloth (*dharma*) in order to be real must have an essence different from

that of the yarn (*dharmi*). This is the reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopts the theory of *asatkāryavāda*. On the other hand, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga builds its philosophy on the conception that the properties (*dharmas*) are not different from their substance (*dharmi*). It is only an aspect or form which is non-existent from its cause. Hence, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga subscribes to the theory of non-difference between the cause (*dharmi*) and the effect (*dharma*).

2.5. EFFECT OF SĀṀKHYA-YOGA AND NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA COMPARAED WITH RESULTANTS AND EMERGENTS

It is pertinent to compare and contrast the effects according to *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* with the emergents and resultants of the Emergent Evolution of Lloyd Morgan and Samuel Alexander.[62] Emergent Evolution distinguishes between 'resultants' and 'emergents' in the evolutionary process.[63] The former stand for the origination of entities that are already existent. Here, the effect is an 'unfolding of what is already enfolded'.[64] The latter refer to the origination of something new, that which is 'unpredictable from the pre-existent events'.[65] Whereas the resultant can be predicted, expected or calculated even before its occurrence, the emergent cannot be predicted, foreseen or calculated.

The followers of Emergent Evolution accept that the evolutionary process gives rise to both emergents and resultants. When life evolves from matter, life is regarded by them as an emergent. Similarly, mind which evolves from life and consciousness from mind are regarded as emergents. The meaning of emergence is that it is not predictable from the pre-existent events . It does not stand for mere re-grouping of what was already existent, but a new event or an entity. For example, no one can predict that molecules in a state of vapour would give rise to liquid after cooling.[66] Similarly, nobody can predict the origin of life from matter, mind from life and consciousness from mind. Hence, they are characterised as emergents. However, the followers of Emergent

Evolution do believe that changes such as wood into various items of furniture or gold into various ornaments stand for the resultants only, since changes here involve merely the re-grouping of the existing entities.

The effects of *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika broadly stand for resultants and emergents of Emergent Evolution respectively. But all effects in *satkāryavāda* stand for resultants only and in *asatkāryavāda* for emergents only. At no stage of production can we conceive of emergents in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and resultants in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣ ika. The effects, according to the former, accordingly stand for the 'unfoldment of what is enfolded' and according to the latter for 'unpredictable from pre-existent events.'

NOTES AND REFFERENCES

1. *ārambhavādaḥ kaṇabhakṣapakṣaḥ*
   saṅghātavādastu bhadantapakṣaḥ |
   sāṁkhyadipakṣaḥ pariṇāmavādaḥ
   vedāntapakṣastu vivartavādaḥ || S.S.II. 63
2. RV.X.129.1
3. *śvetaketo yannu somyedaṁ mahāmanā anucānaḥ*
   māni stabdho' si uta tamādeśama prākṣyaḥ |
   yenāśrutam śrutam bhavati amatam mata mavijñātaṁ
   vijñātamiti kathaṁ nu bhagavah sa ādeśo bhavatīti || CU.VI.i.2,3.
4. *nā'sato vidyate bhāvo*
   nā'bhāvo vidyate sataḥ | BG.II.16.
5. *navastuno vastusiddhiḥ* | SPS.I.78.
6. *Ibid*.I.115-118, 121.
7. *asad-akaraṇād upādāna-grahaṇāt,*
   sarvasaṁbhavā-bhāvāt |
   śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt,
   kāraṇa-bhāvāc ca satkāryam || SK.IX
   For more details see Gerald James Larson, 'The Notion of Satkārya

   in Sāṁkhya-Yoga Towards a Philosophical Reconstruction', PEW, Vol. XXV, No.1 Jan. 1975, pp.31-40.
   Also, Richard M. Gale, 'Why a Cause Cannot be Later Than its Effect', TRM, Vol. XIX, 1965-66, pp. 209-223.
   And also see Anima Sen Gupta, 'In Defence of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā Definition of the Cause', PAS, Vol. IX, July-October, 1974, Nos.3,4, pp.120ff.
8. SK.IX.
9. GB.IX.
10. STK.IX.
11. *nāsadutpādo nṛsṛngavat* | SPS.I.114.
12. STK.IX.
13. *sarvatra sarvadā sarvāsaṁbhavāt* | SPS.I.116
14. *Ibid*.I.117.
15. STK.IX.
16. SPS.I.118.
17. STK.IX.
18. BG.II.16.
19. GB.IX.
20. Is a kind of grass, the grain of which is eaten by poor (*Paspolum-scrobiculatum* is its botanical name).
21. STK.IX.
22. YD. See under IX.
23. STK.IX.
24. *Ibid.*
25. For more details see Bhimal Krishna Matilal, 'Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School', PEW, Vol. XXV, No.1, Jan. 1975, pp. 41-48. The Vaiśeṣika view is the same as that of the Naiyāyikas.
26. M.K.V. Iyer, *Advaita Vedānta According to Śaṅkara*, p.103.
27. NKS, p. 58.
28. NS.IV.i.48-50.
29. NK, p. 144
30. NM, p.493.
31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvādasat* | VS.IX.i.1.
35. NB.IV.i.50.
36. NS.IV.i.49.
37. *buddhisiddham tu tadasat* | *Ibid*.IV.i.50.
38. NK, p.144.
39. *svarūpa sahakāryādi hetavo yad vidhayanaḥ* |
    dṛśyante janyate taddhi navyomakusumādhikaṃ | | NM,p. 494.
40. SPS.I.115, STK.IX.
41. NM,pp. 493,494.
42. *asatica kārye niralambanaḥ kārakavyāpāro bhavet* | NM,p. 493.
43. NB.IV.i.50.
44. NVTT,p. 622.
45. *adyatve vyavahāropi naivāpurvaḥ pravartyate* | *yathopalabdhaṁ vṛddhebhyaḥ sa tataivānugamyate* | NM,p. 494.
46. *satkāryavāde ca sūtrāṁ upādānaniyamo durghataḥ* | *sarvaśya sarvatra bhāvāt sikatātīla sarastīrakedāra* | Ibid.p. 495.
47. *api ca prāyaścittaṁ yeṣa tapasvi tapta kṛcchraṁ atikaṣṭam katham carisyatīti mahangatosi kāruṇyaṁ* | *annam ca tāvat asnāti anteca varcostīti vid bhakṣanāt prāyaś cittīyata evāyam* |*Ibid.*
48. NK, pp. 342,343.
49. NSV.IV.i.50.
50. English translation by D. Venkatramaiah, p.160.
51. NK, p. 144.
52. NM, p. 495.
53. For Sāṁkhya position refer pp. 39-41.
54. NK, pp. 342, 343.
55. *na ca kārya kāraṇayoḥ abhedāt satkāryamiti vaktavyaṃ* | *yahoḥ pratyakṣa siddha bhinna svarūpatvāt* | NM, p. 496.
56. BG.II.16.
57. STK.IX.
58. *Ibid.*
59. '*Samavāyi-kāraṇa*', according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is that cause wherein the effect originates and resides by the relation of inherence.
    yatsamavetaṁ kāryamutpadhyate tatsamavāyi kāraṇaṃ | TS.XL.

60. STK.IX.
61. A.C. Ewing, *Idealism*, p.172.
    For details see Jitendra Mohan Chandra, 'Can Cause and Effect be Contemporaneous?, IPQ, Vol. VII, pp.81-89.
62. Sri M.K. Venkatarama Iyer, 'Darwin, Alexander, Aurobindo, and Śaṅkara on Evolution', PB., Vol. LXIX, March 1964, pp. 103,104.
63. For details see Discussions, Flora I. Mackinnon, 'The Meaning of "Emergent" in Lloyd C. Morgan's *Emergent Evolution*, Mind, Vol. XXXIII, New Series 1924, pp. 311-315.
64. Lloyd C. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, His article, 'A Philosophy of Evolution in Contemporary British Philosophy', Ist Series, pp. 297ff.
65. Lloyd C. Morgan, *Gifford Lectures*, 1922, pp. 3,65.
66. *Ibid.* Also see Arthur, O.Lovejoy, 'The Meaning of "Emergence" and its Modes', JPS, Vol.II, 1927, pp. 167-181.

CHAPTER III

Pariṇāmavāda

The *satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya-Yoga implies that the effect is prefigured in its material cause (and hence, it is non-different from its material cause). On the assumption that the effect is non-different from its material cause, we have two theories in respect of the processes involved in the production of an effect. According to one theory, production involves a real change of cause whereas according to the other theory, production involves merely an apparent change in the cause. The former view is that of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga called '*pariṇāmavāda*'—the doctrine which involves real change in the cause in the process of the production of an effect. The latter view is called '*vivartavāda*' and held by the Śaṇkara school of Advaita Vedānta, according to which production involves only an illusory change as when a rope appears like a snake.

3.1. PARIṆĀMA

Pariṇāma[1] stands for change. The *Yoga Bhāsya*[2] defines '*pariṇāma*' as that change which involves the 'disappearance of the previous aspect (*dharma*) and appearance of another aspect of a substance (*dharmi*), while the substance itself remains constant'. The *Yukti Dīpikā*[3] illustrates the process of *pariṇāma* as follows: just as a *palāsa* leaf under the impact of heat and such other efficient causes

gives up its greenness and becomes yellow and yet does not lose its identity of *palāsa-hood*, an object undergoing *pariṇāma* does not lose its identity. '*Pariṇāma*' stands for that change wherein existing qualities in a substance disappear and a different set of qualities appear in their place. When we say that the existing qualities disappear, it does not mean that they vanish into nothing; it only means that they have gone out of our sight, they have lapsed into their unmanifest state. Similarly, when we claim that a different set of qualities appear, it does not mean that qualities that are alien to the substance originate in it. It only means that the qualities that hitherto remained unmanifest, and were not in our sight have become manifest and come into our sight. When, for instance, clay is changed into a pot, the 'pot' is not something foreign to the clay. The pot is an aspect of the clay which remains unmanifest in it prior to its production and becomes manifest under the impact of causal operation by the potter with the help of the other auxiliary causes, namely, his wheel, staff, etc. Similarly, when a pot is destroyed, i.e., rendered into pot-halves, it does not mean that the pot has totally vanished. It only means that the pot has lapsed into its causal state of pot-halves. *Pariṇāma*, therefore, does not permit the production of the totally new and the total destruction of the existing one.

We have to understand the *Prakṛti-pariṇāma* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in the light of its above position. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga, as we have seen, accepts two ultimate reals, namely, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*—the former, standing for the principle of consciousness and the latter, for the principle of primordial matter. The former is neither the cause nor an effect, whereas the latter functions as the ultimate material cause of all products in the world.

3.1.1. Prakṛti as the Primordial Material Cause

According to the Naiyāyikas, the ultimate material cause[4] is not one but many atoms (*paramāṇus*). They are of four kinds, namely,

atoms of air, fire, water and earth. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga, committed as it is to the philosophy of unity, points to single primordial material cause of the world, namely, *Prakṛti*.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy never admits the causality of *Puruṣa*.[5] *Puruṣa* is neither the material cause nor the efficient cause. Admission of the non-causal nature of *Puruṣa* alone would remain compatible with the unchangeability of the spiritual principle. Further, according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, cause can never be *apariṇāmi*. In order to produce the effect, the cause must either undergo change or it must exert active influence to bring about the effect. Therefore, the cause ceases to be immutable. *Puruṣa* being immutable cannot be the cause of the world. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is the first in the fold of orthodox systems to declare that immutability and causality cannot belong to one and the same *tattva*.[6]

But, why should it be held that *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the world? Why should we not accept any finite or limited entity among the evolutes of *Prakṛti* as the material cause? The Sāṁkhya-Yoga replies that what is limited cannot be the material cause of all[7] as, for example, threads cannot be the material cause of a pot. Finite things such as wood, gold, clay, etc., can be the material causes of their respective effects which are also finite and none of them can function as the material cause of all products in the world. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*[8] says that which is limited is perishable. On the other hand the *Vedas* declare *Pradhāna* as the cause of the world.[9] It is the root cause of the world, since it does not evolve from any other thing. Guided by the principle of economy, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga accepts one imperishable ultimate cause, namely, *Prakṛti* to account for all products in the world.

Since the root has no root, it is root-less.[10] Aniruddha[11] says that there being no root, that is no cause; the *Mūla-Prakṛti*, the root evolvent, the cause which is root-less, is the root (of all). Vijñāna Bhikṣu[12] explains us, why *Prakṛti* must be the uncaused cause of everything and why it must be infinite and all-pervasive.

The ultimate cause of everything cannot itself have a cause; otherwise, it cannot be the ultimate cause. For this reason, *Prakṛti* is called the primary (*Pradhāna*),[13] the root-cause. The root material cause of the twenty-three principles, that is, *Pradhāna*, is root-less because, further root cannot be possible and if it were to be, there would be an infinite regression.

3.1.2. Disturbance of the Equilibrium of Prakṛti

As the ultimate material cause of all things in the world, *Prakṛti* in its unevolved state is the equipoise of the three *guṇas* and evolution starts when there is a disturbance in the *guṇa* equilibrium. The question, therefore, arises: What is it that causes the disturbance of the equilibrium? The Sāṁkhya ascribes this to the proximity of *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti*. The relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is the crux of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. *Prakṛti* is active but unconscious.[14] Puruṣa is conscious but inactive. Further, there is no place for God in the Sāṁkhya. Evolution and dissolution being periodical processes, the Sāṁkhya finds it difficult to account for the starting of the evolutionary process at a particular time. In the absence of an intelligent Supreme God, an unmoved mover, the Sāṁkhya has to rely on its philosophy of unconscious teleology. There is some inherent teleology (unconscious) in the guṇas as a result of which they produce this world. The inherent teleology manifests itself in the form of *Prakṛti* unknowingly serving the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *Puruṣa*. Hence, this blind teleological force of nature is also said to be due to the transcedental influence of the spiritual principle (*Puruṣa*). 'Just as the unintelligent milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of the calf, so also the unconscious Pradhāna functions to liberate *Puruṣa* from the sorrows and sufferings of this world'[15]. Thus, unconscious teleology is an improtant hypothesis on the ground of which the Sāṁkhya school seeks to explain the evolution of this well-ordered universe by an unconscious *Prakṛti* even in the absence of any active guidance from a conscious *Puruṣa*.

The real object of disturbance in the *guṇa* equilibrium and the evolution of the world is two-fold: (1) *Prakṛti* becomes the object of experience of *Puruṣa* and (2) *Puruṣa* attains release from the torments and tortures of life on perceiving its own distinction from *Prakṛti*. The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* XXI[16] runs thus: 'For the sake of *Puruṣa's* perception of *Prakṛti* and for his release, a union of the two takes place, which resembles a union of the lame and the blind. By that union, evolution of the world is effected'. The *Yoga Sūtra* of Patañjali[17] says: 'The union between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* takes place for the sake of knowing the essential nature of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti'*.

The equilibrium of the *guṇas* gets disturbed by the proximity (*sānnidhya*) of the *Puruṣa*. Just as the magnet attracts iron by its mere proximity, so *Puruṣas* move *Prakṛti* to evolution by their mere proximity. Just as the magnet is the unmoved mover of iron, so *Puruṣa* is the unmoved mover of *Prakṛti*.[18] The proximity of Puruṣa breaks up the original equilibrium of the *guṇas* whereupon they try to dominate one another. The question, what makes the originally pure *Puruṣa* associate itself with the undisturbed *Prakṛti*, remains an ultimate mystery, in this school. A few unsatisfactory explanations are given. Īśavara Kṛṣṇa[19] says that the seeming contact between the two disparate substances, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, is effected by showing *Prakṛti* to *Puruṣa*, 'who could not have had any desire to see it', so that he will see it with all its evils and will then be without any desire to see it at all. Bringing them together is like burning the finger of a child so that in future it will not like to go near fire. It seems that the occasion for contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is adventitious, for there is no third ground to bring about the contact.[20] According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu[21] the contact is beginningless (*anādi*) and is of the nature of the relation between the proprietor and his propriety (*svasvāmi-bhāva*) and is strengthened by the life of action. According to Pañcasikha,[22] it is beginningless and due to ignorance (*avidya*) *Puruṣa* is really different from *Prakṛti*.[23] But all agree that the contact has no beginning. Consequently, the compulsions of the Sāṁkhya metaphysics drive us towards the eternality of the world as is held by the Mīmāṁsakas. But paradoxically, belief in the evolution and dissolution of the world gets caught in its own trap.

Though the Sāṁkhya cannot satisfactorily explain how the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* is disturbed and the evolution of *Prakṛti* begins, the Yoga covers this deficiency by grafting the concept of God who is supposed to disturb the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* and start its evolution. God directs the evolution of *Prakṛti* and dissolves the world into *Prakṛti*.[24] The Sāṁkhya does not believe in God. It holds that some transcendental influence of *Puruṣa* disturbs the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* and starts its evolution. *Puruṣa* is the unmoved mover of *Prakṛti* even as Aristotle's God is the unmoved mover of matter and the efficient cause of evolution.

3.1.3. The Purpose, Meaning and Order of Evolution

The *Sāṁkhya kārikā* XXI attempts to explain the utility of the conjunction beween *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* by the simile of the 'lame man and the blind one'. The lame though capable of seeing the way cannot walk, while the blind though capable of walking cannot see the way. But the lame when placed on the shoulders of the blind can direct the latter to proceed ahead. Thus, it is seen that their joint activity can serve a common end which none of them can fulfil by himself, without the help of the other. Similarly, *Puruṣa* is inactive, but it is conscious, while *Prakṛti* is active, but it is unconscious. However, their mutual co-operation can bring about an end which either of them cannot achieve independently of the other. Now, what is this end (aim or purpose) for which evolution proceeds?

This end is the release of *Puruṣa*, isolation (*kaivalya*) of *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti*. *Pururṣa's* end is to free from the clasp of *Prakṛti*. Though it is without any attribute, yet appropriates pleasure, pain and such other properties of *Prakṛti* to its own self, and thus

becomes affected by them. Strictly speaking, it is not to be touched by these attributes. But due to its association with *Prakṛti*, he fails to discriminate his own self from that of *Prakṛti*. But when this discriminative knowledge dawns, he differentiates itself from *Prakṛti* and thus regains his true nature. In this state, it realises that pain belongs to *Prakṛti* and thus withdraws himself forever from the province of *Prakṛti*. This is liberation called isolation (*kaivalya*) from the clutches of matter (*Prakṛti*). Evolution (*pariṇāma*) does not permit the emergence of the new, but only the manifestation of the unmanifest. The passage of the evolution involves a transition from the potential to the actual (*āvirbhāva*), from the undifferentiated to the differentiated (*saṁsṛṣṭāviveka*), from the indeterminate or non-specific (*aviśeṣa*) to the determinate or specific (*liṅga*),[25] from the homogeneous (*sarūpa-pariṇāma*) to the heterogeneous (*virūpa-pariṇāma*).

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga evolution involves the gradual development of the different categories of existence. *Prakṛti* is transformed into *mahat* or cosmic intellect (*buddhi*). *Mahat* is transformed into *ahaṁkāra* or cosmic egoism. Ahaṁkāra is transformed into the eleven sense organs, and the five *tanmātras* or subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The five subtle essences are transformed into the five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth. These are the twenty-four principles.[26] Including *Puruṣa*, we have twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[27] But *Puruṣa* is neither the evolute nor the evolvent.

3.1.4. Evolutes of *Prakṛti*

3.1.4.1. *Mahat*

Mahat (the great one) is the first evolute of *Mūla-Prakṛti*. The reason for calling it great (*mahat*) lies in the fact that it is great in space as well as in time; for there is no other evolute which is so exhaustive and durable as *mahat*.[28] It is also referred to as

'*buddhi*'(intellect), '*mati*' (understanding or thought or inclination), and *prajña* (insight or wisdom).

Mahat is the first principle which is manifest (*vyakta*). Since it is caused, it is finite, non-pervasive, plural, etc., like other evolutes.[29] It is characterised by ascertainment or determination (*adhyavasāya*), virtue (*dharma*), wisdom (*jñāna*), non-attachment (*virāga*), possession of lordly powers (*aiśvarya*) which constitute its *sāttvika* form.[30] Cultivation of *sāttvika buddhi* results in the formation of a virtuous character while the increase of *tāmasika* properties in the intellect brings a man down to the level of a lower animal. So, the river like *citta* flows in two currents, virtuous and vicious. In the *Yoga Bhāṣya*, it is described as an extensive transparent stuff like the bright sky.[31]

Of the different *sāttvika* properties, virtue is that which leads to sucess in this world and also in the other. Wisdom is the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit. Non-attachment or dispassion helps one to get merged in *Prakṛti*. This *Prakṛti-līna* condition is a condition of bondage. But, it is a higher level of bondage brought about by non-attachment to actions and their results. Non-attachment is of four levels.[32] The lordly powers are of eight kinds.[33]

The *sāttvika* properties of *mahat* are capable of leading a person to a higher stage of detachment. But, it cannot help him to attain liberation. Liberation can be attained only by the acquisition of discriminative knowledge that *Puruṣa* is different from *Prakṛti*. All the *tāmasika* properties act as obstacles in the path of liberation and keep a man bound to the circle of birth and rebirth.

3.1.4.2. *Ahaṁkāra*

From *mahat* evolves *ahaṁāra*. The term '*ahaṁkāra*' is difficult to translate. It is made up of the personal pronoun 'I' (*ahaṁ*) and the practical '*kāra*', which means 'making', 'doing', 'working', etc. It is usually translated as 'ego', 'individuation', etc. Van Buitenen,[34] emphasising the cosmic significance of the term, understands it as the creative cry, 'I'. In the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*,[35] the

term is equated with *abhimāna*,[36] which implies such notions as 'conceit', 'pride', or 'erroneous conception', etc. Conceit in the ego of the form 'I exist', 'I know', 'I have this or that duty to perform or abstain from', etc., precedes determination. It is the ground on which determination is based.

Ahaṁkāra is a determinate form of *mahat*.[37] Its function is *abhimāna* or self-assertion. It is only when *ahaṁvṛtti* is generated in the intelligised *mahat* that there arises real enjoyment of pleasures and suffering of pains. It is the *ahaṁkāra* that induces *Puruṣa* to wrongly consider itself the agent of actions.

The Sāṁkhya[38] speaks of three-fold *ahaṁkāra* (1) *vaikṛta*, (2) *taijasa* and (3) *bhūtādi*. The first one abounds in *sattva*, the second in *rajas* and the third in *tamas*. This division has been planned with a view to explaining the sixteen evolutes of *ahaṁkāra* which are bifurcated into two series, subjective and objective. The names, *vaikṛta*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*, are suggestive. The first means the basis of evolutes, the second stands for the bright and fiery, the third refers to the evolution of the elements.

From *vaikṛta ahaṁkāra* or *sāttvika ahaṁkāra* the subjective series comprising the eleven organs emanate. These are the mind (*manas*), the five sense organs (*jñānendriyas*) and the organs of action (*karmendriyas*).[39] It is on this level of evolution that man is first in contact with the external or gross world.

Mind (*manas*) is an organ both of cognition and action as seen from its function. The *manas* is described as *saṁkalpaka*,[40] i.e., it is constructive, reflective, analytic and explicative. The mind serves as a bridge between *mahat* and *ahaṁkāra* on the one hand, and the senses and organs of action on the other. Thus, it is also a bridge between the internal and external world. Mind together with *mahat* and *ahaṁkāra* makes up the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*).[41] It is also characterised as an *indriya*.[42] Mind is involved primarily in waking experience of man. It is also involved in the internal functioning of man in so far as it provides the distinct impressions, constructions, etc. Mind is non-atomic[43] and can come into contact with several senses at a time.[44]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga speaks of ten *indriyas* which are brought into two groups.[45] The *indriyas* are not formed of the gross elements (*bhūtas*).[46] The senses (*indriyas*) are supra-sensuous and imperceptible powers located in the external physical and perceptible organs. However, they are wrongly identified with their substrata like the eyeball, etc.[47] Plurality of organs does not bring about chaos. Each organ has its own field of activity and does not encroach upon that of others. Eye, ear, skin, tongue and nose apprehend visual appearance, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively. Similarly, the organ of speech, hands, feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation perform the function of speaking, grasping, motion, excretion and the sexual gratification respectively.[48]

Intellect (*mahat*), individuation (*ahaṁkāra*) and the mind (*manas*) constitute the internal organs (*antaḥ-karaṇa*). On the other hand, the ten senses (*indriyas*) are external organs. The circulation of vital airs, *prāṇa, apāna, udāna, samāna, vyāna* is a common function of the internal organs.[49] The internal organs function in the past, present and future, whereas the external organs function only in the present time.[50] The external organs are compared to gates, while the internal organs are called gate-keepers. This thirteen-fold instrument functions as a whole by seizing (*āharaṇa*), holding (*dhāraṇa*) and manifestation (*prakāśakara*).[51]

3.1.4.3. *Tanmātras*

The *bhūtādi* form of *ahaṁkāra* (*tāmasa ahaṁkāra*) which dominates in *tamas* generates the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*) of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.[52] These are called (1) *śabda tanmātra*, (2) *sparśa tanmātra*, (3) *rūpa tanmātra*, (4) *rasa tanmātra* and (5) *gandha tanmātra* respectively. These *tanmātras* like *mahat* and *ahaṁkāra* are both creative (*Prakṛti*) and created (*vikṛti*).[53] The term '*tanmātra*' means 'only so much or little', 'rudimentary', or 'trifle'.

The *tanmātras* are inert, but possess quantum or mass which is due to preponderance of *tamas* element in them. Ordinary beings cannot perceive them, but they are open to the *yogins* and such other superior beings. These are stated as non-specific (*aviśeṣa*)[54] because, the different aspects of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in them cannot be distinctively experienced by us.[55] The reason for calling them *tanmātras* lies in the fact that they do not reveal the specific (*viśeṣa*) characteristics of their inherent properties.

The *tanmātras* possess the following notable characteristics:

1. They have evolved from the *bhūtādi* or *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*.
2. They are non-specific subtle essences which produce the gross elements and their qualities.
3. They are infra-sensible and, therefore, cannot be directly perceived by the power of the senses of the ordinary human beings.
4. These *tanmātras* are not as undifferentiated and indeterminate as the mere mass or *bhūtādi*. There is some determination even in *tanmātric* stage as they are already called '*śabda tanmātra*', '*sparśa tanmātra*',etc.

3.1.4.4. *Mahābhūtas*

From the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) evolve the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) of ether, air, fire, water, and earth. Ether (*ākāśa*) has the characteristics of sound (*śabdamayasatta*), air, (*vāyu*) has the characteristic of touch (*śparśamayasatta*), fire (*tejas*) has the characteristic of colour (*rūpamaya-satta*), water (*āpaḥ*) has the characteristic of taste (*rasamayasatta*) and the earth (*pṛthivī*) has the characteristic of smell (*gandhamayasatta*). The gross elements (*mahābhūtas*) are specific because, they are perceived as distinct, being possessed of different qualities. The evolutes of the gross elements are of two kinds.

1. Bodies gross and subtle born of parents belong to the first division. These are proximate to intelligence and appearing like intelligence. Of these, the gross bodies are endowed by father and mother. They are composed of the six constituents or sheaths (*kośas*) of hair, blood, flesh, tendon, bone and marrow. Bodies constituted of these perish and are reduced to dust or ashes. The subtle body is constant throughout change.
2. The gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth and the object constituted by them belong to the second division.

The gross elements which are produced from the *tanmātras* constitute the limit of *Prākṛtıc* evolution. After the production of the gross elements, evolution in the sense that there is transition from the subtle to the gross stops. From gross elements onwards, evolution is only a transition within the gross elements; it is not marked by difference between the evolute and the evolvent in respect of grossness.

According to Vācaspati Miśra,[56] *ahaṁkāra*, in its *sāttvika* aspect evolves into *manas*, the five organs of knowledge (*jñānendriyas*) and the five organs of action (*karmendriyas*). *Ahaṁkāra*, in its *tāmasa* aspect evolves into the five subtle essences (*tanmātras*), namely, colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), touch (*sparśa*) and audition (*śabda*).

Vijñāna Bhikṣu[57] differs from the above view and gives a slightly different account of the evolution of the cosmos. According to him, *Prakṛti* gives rise to *mahat* which in turn gets modified into *ahaṁkāra*, and *ahaṁkāra* in its *sāttvika* aspect evolves into *manas*. The organs of sense and action emanate from the *rajas* aspect of *ahaṁkāra*. The subtle elements (*tanmātras*) evolve from the tāmasa aspect of *ahaṁkāra*.

Different opinions of the Sāṁkhya teachers regarding the evolution of senses and *tanmātras* are recorded in the *Yukti Dīpikā*.[58]

Pañcādhikaraṇa is of the opinion that senses arise out of *mahābhūtas*. Vinddyavāsin holds that tanmātras along with *ahaṁkāra* emanate from *mahat*.

Patañjali[59] says that *sattva* with its power of restraint, *rajas* with its power of action and *tamas* with its power of indifference are modified into the known universe consisting of subtle and gross elements of matter and the physical apparatus, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, and the three internal organs, mind (*manas*), intellect (*buddhi*), and egoism (*ahaṁkāra*), to realise the ends of the *Puruṣas*.

Vyāsa[60] says that the subtle essence of sound has the quality of sound only; the subtle essence of touch has two qualities, sound and touch; the subtle essence of colour has three qualities, sound, touch and colour; the subtle essence of taste has four qualities, sound, touch, colour, taste and the subtle essence of smell has five qualities, sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The subtle essences are called the five elements. The atoms of five elements are generated from the subtle essences. Hence, atoms are not the ultimate indivisible parts of the gross elements in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga but are the evolutes of the *tanmātras* only. The earth atom is generated from the five subtle essences of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, of which smell is the chief. The water atom is generated from the four subtle essences of taste, colour, touch and sound, of which taste is the chief. The fire atom is generated from the three subtle essences of colour, touch and sound of which colour is the chief. The air atom is generated from the two subtle essences of touch and sound, of which touch is the chief. The ether atom is generated from the subtle essence of sound.[61] Each of the subtle essences is the chief constituent of the specific kind of atom generated by it, though other subtle essences are combined with it.[62]

The atoms of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, therefore, are not the ultimate particles of matter as conceived by the Vaiśeṣika. They are effects, since they are evolved from the *tanmātras*. However, the

tanmātras of the Sāṁkhya can be compared to a certain extent with the *paramāṇus* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Just as the four kinds of *paramāṇus* are the subtle causes of the four gross elements, in the same manner, the *tanmātras* are the subtle causes of five gross elements. Both the *tanmātras* and *parmāṇus* are to be known by us through inference only. In both, the qualities of sound, touch, etc., exist in a latent form because of the very subtle nature of these infra-sensible elements. Just as in the *tanmātric* stage, tanmātras could be differentiated at least as *śabda tanmātra*, *sparśa tanmātra*, etc., in the same manner, the atoms also could be differentiated into four kinds. According to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the qualities of the *mahābhutas* are due to the qualities latent in these subtle causal substances.

There are however, some important points of difference between the *tanmātras* of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and *paramāṇus* (atoms) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The *paramāṇus* are co-eternal with God and they constitute the ultimate material stuff of the universe. The *tanmātras*, on the other hand, are not eternal, being the products of *Prakṛti*. They do not also constitute the root casue of the universe. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not hold substance and quality as different, as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka. On the other hand, this school admits identity (*tādātmya*) between the quality and the possessor of quality. Therefore, it does not matter in the least whether the *tanmātras* of the Sāṁkhya are considered as substances or as qualities. Whereas in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the *tanmātras* are the causes of the five gross elements as well as of their qualities, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the *paramāṇus* (being only substances) are the causes of the four *mahābhūtas* which are causes of their respective qualities. In spite of these differences, we may hold logically that as the basic principles of the physical world, the *tanmātras* occupy a place similar to that of the *paramāṇus*. They indeed, lay the corner-stone of this multi-coloured Universe, a Universe which is known and acted upon by the organs of sensation and action.

3.2. KINDS OF PARIṆĀMA

The claim that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga subscribes to the doctrine of *pariṇāma*[63] needs to be explained in the context of the evolution of *Prakṛti* into the manifold objects of the world through different stages. The concept of '*pariṇāma*' as we have seen already does not permit the emergence of the new, but implies the manifestation of the unmanifest. Thus, when the Sāṁkhya-Yoga contends that '*mahat*' evolves from *Prakṛti*, the evolute '*mahat*' is not foreign to its evolvent '*Prakṛti*'; it was there already in *Prakṛti* in an unmanifest form. What was unmanifest in its causal state becomes manifest in its effect state. Similarly, when *mahat* evolves into *ahaṁkāra*, the latter must be supposed to pre-figure in its cause in an unmanifest form. Following this logic, we have to assume that according to *parināmavāda*, the evolute can never be different from its evolvent.

In the process of evolution of *Prakṛti* into the manifold objects of the world, we can distinguish between two kinds of *pariṇāma*, namely, (1) *Sarūpa* and *Virūpa pariṇāma*, (2) *Tattva* and *Tattvāntara pariṇāma*.

3.2.1. Sarūpa-Pariṇāma and Virūpa-Pariṇāma

We know that *prakṛti* is always dynamic and pulsating with activity. To say that it is *dynamic* is to accept that it is undergoing change. This change is of two kinds, namely, *sarūpa* and *virūpa*. The change within each *guṇa* as when *sattva* changes into *sattva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*, without inter-mixing, is called *sarūpa-pariṇāma* (*sadṛśa-pariṇāma*), i.e., the homogeneous change. In this state *Prakṛti* remains indeterminate, undifferentiated and in a state of equilibrium. But, when the *guṇas* began to overpower one another, the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* gets disturbed and this leads to the manifestation of the heterogeneous phenomena of the world starting from *mahat*. This change is called heterogeneous change, *virūpa-pariṇāma* (*visadṛśa-pariṇāma*).

But in both kinds of *pariṇāma* there is no such thing as replacement of one substance by a totally different substance, but mere manifestation of the same substance in a different form. In *sarūpa-pariṇāma* a single *guṇa*, e.g. *sattva*, manifests itself in different forms while producing its kind, whereas in *virūpa-pariṇāma* the three *guṇas* jointly manifest themselves in different forms with the predominance of one over the other two.

Virūpa-pariṇāma is of two kinds namely, (1) *Tattvāntara-pariṇāma* and (2) *Tattva-pariṇāma*.

3.2.2 Tattvāntara-Pariṇāma and Tattva-Pariṇāma

The chang, wherein one *tattva* gives rise to another *tattva*, is called *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*. It stands for the evolution of a different category of existence (*tattvāntara*) as that of the evolution of *mahat* from *Prakṛti, ahaṁkāra* from *mahat*, *tanmātras* and the senses (*indriyas*) from *ahaṁkāra* under the five subtle elements on the other under the dominance of *tamas*. In this kind of *pariṇāma* the transition is from the subtle to the gross state. Accordingly, compared with the evolvent *Prakṛti*, its evolute, *mahat* is gross and the grossness increases gradually as the evolution of *Prakṛti* progresses futher. Vācaspati Miśra observes that the difference between one *tattva* and another consists in the degree of their subtlety or grossness.[64] Though the *tanmātras* are evolved from *ahaṁkāra,* the traces of *ahaṁkāra* are not easily discernible in the *tanmātras*. They acquire properties which look different from those of *ahaṁkāra*. So, when the atoms are evolved from the *tanmātras*, they look different from the latter, since they acquire sensible properties which are not manifest in the *tanmātras*.[65] Thus, the evolution of one *tattva* from another leading to the increase in its grossness is termed *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*.[66]

The change within the same category of existence (*tattva*) is called *tattva-pariṇāma*. Unlike termed *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*, in *tattva-pariṇāma,* the evolvent and the evolute are the same with

regard to their grossness or subtlety. In the process of evolution, at the stage of gross elements, namely, ether, air, fire water and earth, each of them further evolves into its respective products. The gross element earth, for instance, changes into its products such as pots, saucers, cups, etc., which are also of earthly nature. Here, the evolvent and the evolute belong to the same order of grossness. When pot is produced from clay, it cannot be taken that the clay is less gross and its evolutes, pot, etc., are more gross. Both of them, the evolvent (clay) and its evolute (pot) belong to the same order of grossness. So, the evolution of clay into earthen pots, etc., is called *tattva-pariṇāma*, i.e., change within the same category of existence (*tattva*). Similarly, the elements water, fire and air giving rise to their respective evolutes is also called *tattva pariṇāma*, because they and their products belong to the same level as far as their grossness is concerned.

One is likely to think that though in *tattva-pariṇāma* there is appearance or disappearance of an aspect (*dharma*) in or from an enduring substance, in *tattvāntara-pariṇāma* where one *tattva* such as *Prakṛti* gives rise to another *tattva*, namely, *mahat* is not a mere aspect (*dharma*) of *Prakṛti*, but a totally different existent. But Vyāsa's account in his *Yoga Bhāṣya* steers clear off all such doubts. Vyāsa says that *tattvāntara-pariṇāma* is on the same level as *tattva-pariṇāma* so far as in both there is no creation of a new substance. He also says that the gross elements starting with ether (*ākāśa*) are the *dharmas* of their respective subtle elements (*tanmātras*).[67] In the same way, *ahaṁkāra* is the *dharma* of its evolvent, *mahat*; and the sense organs and the subtle elements are the *dharmas* of *ahaṁkāra*. So, in both the kinds of *pariṇāma*, one substance is not replaced by another substance which is totally distinct, although some properties disappear and some other properties appear in the primary substance which is enduring, namely, *Prakṛti*. Hiriyanna points out that it is just as in the game of dice; they are ever the same dice but as they fall in various ways, they mean to us different things.[68]

The changes in *tattva* and *tattvāntara-pariṇāma* are of three kinds, namely, *Dharma, Lakṣaṇa* and *Avasthā*.

3.2.3. Dharma Lakṣaṇa and Avasthā Pariṇama

We usually distinguish between the substances (*dharmi*) of an object and its qualities or aspects (*dharmas*). The change wherein substance (*dharmi*) remains the same while its qualities (*dharmas*) appear and disappear, as when a leaf remaining in essence (*dharmi*) a leaf, changes its colour (*dharma*) from green to yellow, It is called *dharma-pariṇama*.[69] It is the persistence of the essence, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* amidst changes, that accounts for the identity of cause and effect. The three *guṇas* present themselves in the cause in a particular proportion and in the effect in another proportion. *Dharma-pariṇāma*, therefore, stands for the appearance and the disappearance of qualities (*dharmas*) in or from a substance (*dharma*) that abides.

Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma refers to the change of an aspect (*dharma*) in a time-series. All the aspects (*dharmas*) that an object presents at different times may be viewed as existing in the object as latent, actual and sublatent form which may be termed respectively as past (*atīta*), present (*vartamāna*) and future (*anāgata*). So, the production or manifestation of a thing has to be apprehended from the point of view of three stages—past, present and the future. Prior to its manifestation,[70] an aspect (*dharma*) exists in the material cause in a sublatent or future (*anāgata*) form; after its production it exists in its actual or present (*vartamāna*) form and after its supposed destruction,[71] it lapses into its latent or past (*atīta*) state. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is committed to the view that there is no production of the non-existent and destruction of the existent. Everything exists always in different states. Thus, an aspect (*dharma*) when it enters into its present (*vartamāna*) stage from its future (*anāgata*) state it undergoes a change. At that stage its present aspect only becomes prominent, while it is not alto-

gether detached from its past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) stages. The *Bhāṣya*[72] illustrates it by the simile of a man when attached to a particular woman is not absolutely free from his passion for other women. The fact is that, his passion for a particular woman becomes prominent at that time, while it becomes latent towards other women for the time being.

Lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma can be illustrated by the following example also. A stone has a statue already hidden in it and the sculptor only removes the outer parts of it to make it visible. In the same manner, the jar exists already in the lump of clay and it only becomes visible when the potter removes the superfluous parts from it. Therefore, according to the technicality of this philosophy, the jar is said to exist in the clay in an *anāgata* (future) way, i.e., the state of an object as not yet come into our view, before it becomes visible. On its being visible or coming into our view, it is said to be in the *vartamāna* (present) and when it is destroyed, it is said to be in the way called *atīta* (past).[73]

Avasthā-pariṇāma is the change (*pariṇāma*) that an aspect (*dharma*) undergoes in every succeeding moment of its existence with reference to time. An aspect when it exists in its present stage is generally held to be new. But, its newness begins to diminish in every succeeding moment. Thus, what was brand new becomes new, from new it becomes old, from old it turns older, and so on. Thus, everywhere the aspect remains the same, but it looks different with reference to time. It can be illustrated by the case of a woman who becomes a daughter in relation to her parents, mother in relation to her son and grand-mother in relation to her grand-children.[74]

The author of the *Yoga Bhāṣya* states that ultimately there is only one change[75] which is differently described under different circumstances. Thus, the earth material, when giving rise to a pot, is first of all, turned into a lump. From the lump, it assumes another shape, and then another. In this way it passes through different aspect till it is turned into a pot. This is what is called the change of aspect (*dharma-pariṇāma*). Then again, the pot

changes showing comparative oldness and newness in every succeeding moment, and this is called the change of state (*avasthā-pariṇāma*).[76] All these changes do not change the original substance (*dharmi*) which remains constant throughout.[77] According to Vācaspati Miśra, all these aspects (*dharmas*), marks (*lakṣaṇas*) and states (*avasthās*) may, in general, be called *dharmas*.[78] So, the modification of the same substance may be said to be *dharma-pariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and *avasthā-pariṇama* from different points of view.[79]

Change, according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is only the appearance and disappearance of qualities in or from an enduring substance. At no time change involves replacement of one substance by another, change is only change of form, the substance remaining the same. The underlying substance that remains unaffected is called *dharmi* while its varying aspects are called *dharmas*. The *dharmi* is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the *dharmas*. So, the different kinds of *pariṇāma* are nothing but the modification of the same substance viewed from different standpoints.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma* should not be confused with the Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux. According to the Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux, there are only *dharmas* that appear and disappear at every moment and there is no *dharmi* in which they appear and disappear. Buddhism rejects the idea of a *dharmi* or abiding principle, apart from the *dharmas* that appear and disappear. Change, therefore, according to Buddhism is only replacement of one entity by another. 'A thing is not the same at different moments or in different places. Every variation of time and place makes one thing "another" thing'[80]. One element of reality does not change or grow into another but gives rise to another. 'The elements do not change, but disappear'[81]. Jainism, in conformity with its metaphysical presuppositions, recognises the reality of both permanence and change. It believes that whereas the 'substance' remains the same, its modes change.[82]

Although both Jainism and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga accept an abiding substance, they differ in respect of its nature, for Jainism with its belief in a permanent static substance is nearer to commonsense than the Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

The notion of change in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as in Buddhism, implies only the production of something new and not the appearance or disappearance of qualities in an enduring substance. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all effect-substances are wholes (*avayavins*) made out of parts (*avayavas*). A table is a whole made of wooden parts. An ornament such as a necklace is a whole made of parts of gold. Any addition or substraction of a part to or from a particular object (table or neck-lace), change in the arrangement of its parts or change in its qualities by way of disappearance of the existing qualities and origination of new qualities, leads to the destruction of existing entity (whole) and the origination of a new entity. Change involves either the destruction of the existing whole or the origination of a different whole. The conception of change as understood by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga as the disappearance and appearance of qualities in an enduring substance is alien to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism. But, unlike Buddhism which dispenses even with spatial change, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts change of place but rejects change of form. 'Movement, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only means change of place and not change of form'.[83] Both the Nyāya-Viśeṣika and Buddhism reject the notion of *pariṇāma* (change) as understood by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Jainism.

It is only the Sāṁkhya-Yoga which offers the most intelligible theory of change. No other school accepts the phenomenon of change in its true sense. The Buddhist theory accommodates it only in a secondary sense. Nor has the conception of change any place in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika all cases of seeming change always imply the destruction of the previous substance and its replacement by a new one. The word 'change' thus stands banished from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

So far as the Vedānta is concerned, it accepts only one immutable reality, namely, *Brahman*; all the change is only apparent and illusory. It is thus clear that among all the orthodox Indian philosophical schools, the conception of change belongs exclusively to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[84]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is committed to the classical conception of change as explained by A.E. Taylor that 'change by itself apart from a background of identity is impossible for the reason that where there is no underlying identity, there is nothing to change. All change must be change of... and in something'.[85]

3.3. EVALUATION

There are certain principal objections to the Sāṁkhya that are directed against the possibility of the evolution of *Prakṛti* and the purpose which the evolution is said to serve. First of all, it is contended that the process of evolution could not have been started and even if started could not be maintained without the intervention and control of an intelligent agent (*Puruṣa*). The weakness of the Sāṁkhya consists in the separation of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* as absolute and independent entities. As a matter of fact, subject and object are two aspects of the same reality which holds them together and yet transcends them. If *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are absolutely separate and independent entities, then they can never unite together, nor can there be any third entity to unite them. And if they cannot unite, evolution cannot take place.

Prakṛti in the unevolved state is the equipoise of its constituents, the three *guṇas*. Evolution proceeds from a disturbance of the equilibrium of *Prakṛti*. But, what is it that causes the initial disturbance of the equilibrium? *Puruṣa* cannot account for the disturbance, for it is Pure Spirit with no point of contact with *Prakṛti*. The Sāṁkhya realises this difficulty and in order to avoid it says that there is no real contact between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and there only the proximity of *Puruṣa*. The proximity of *Puruṣa*

to *Prakṛti* (*Puruṣa-sannidhimātra*) is sufficient to disturb the equilibrium of the *guṇas* and cause evolution. But, here the Sāṁkhya falls into another difficulty. *Puruṣa* being always proximate to *Prakṛti*, evolution should never stop. Evolution would then be beginningless and endless and the very conception of *Prakṛti* as the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* would be impossible. The Sāṁkhya finds itself between these two horns of dilemma—either no contact and no evolution or else no equilibrium and hence, no *Prakṛti* and no evolution. It is the reflection of *Puruṣa* in *buddhi* which comes into contact with *Prakṛti* and not *Puruṣa* himself. But, if *buddhi* or *mahat* is regarded as the first evolute of *Prakṛti*, how can it arise before evolution to receive the reflection of *Puruṣa*? To avoid this difficulty it is said that *Puruṣa* is reflected in *Prakṛti* itself. If so, then, liberation and dissolution would become impossible because *Prakṛti* being always there and it being the essential nature of *Puruṣa* to identify it with its reflection in *Prakṛti*, it would never get liberated. Moreover, the reflection being always there, there would be no dissolution and so no equilibrium of the *guṇas* and hence no *Prakṛti*. Again, if the bare presence of *Puruṣa* suffices, then this presence obtains even in the so-called condition of release (*Prakṛti* not being destroyed with release) and the possibility of fresh bondage is ever present. If it be said that a semblance of contact is sufficient to disturb the equilibrium, then evolution itself becomes a semblance of evolution, an appearance (*vivarta*) only and no real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Prakṛti*. The scheme of evolution propounded by the doctrine may appear attractive once its inception is made possible; but the inception of the process seems unintelligible on the Sāṁkhya hypothesis of two substances eternally diverse in nature, each having no point of active contact with the other.

It cannot be said that the process of evolution is intelligible in itself granting that it has started somehow. It is said to be guided by a purpose, that of the liberation of the Spirit. But we cannot ascribe 'purpose' to the non-intelligent *Prakṛti*. To say that it is

guided by the goal of the Spirit is again meaningless, since the purpose of one being connot guide another, except in so far as the former controls and uses the latter or the latter unintelligently enters into and assimilates the purpose of the former. Neither possibility is granted, since *Prakṛti* is neither intelligent nor controlled by intelligence. There is also the more fundamental difficulty as to how Spirit, which is pure, unchanging, non-active, can have any purpose at all. The mutability of *Prakṛti* can, in the circumstances, account at best for some kind of changing world, not for an ordered Universe of the kind we perceive and reason about. We should, indeed, expect chaos and not cosmos. What order there is should be accidental and it is not reasonable to hope that such evolution will subserve any purpose, least of all the release of the Spirit.

Evolution, according to the Sāṁkhya, is teleological. But all teleology is conscious and intelligent. Unconscious teleology is a contradiction in terms. Teleology or purpose implies foresight. Purposive action stands for the execution of a pre-conceived purpose. If *Prakṛti* acts to realise the purpose of *Puruṣa*, it must be intelligent and conscious of its purpose. Or, it must be an instrument of the Absolute Spirit or God, who is conscious of the purpose of *Puruṣa*, and guides its activities to realise them, so that the intelligent and purposive acts of God move the seemingly unconscious purposive action of *Prakṛti*. Mechanical causation in the world is subservient to spiritual causation of God. Natural causation is the vehicle of moral causation. The seemingly mechanical causation of *Prakṛti* is adopted to the moral deserts of the individual souls by God who is the inner controller of the realm of nature and the realm of Spirits. The sāṁkhya dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* cannot account for the adoption of the activities of *Prakṛti* to the end of *Puruṣa*. Its logical consequence is theism.

The possibility of orderly evolution of the non-intelligent *Prakṛti* is sought to be established by the Sāṁkhya on the gound of various analogies. But unconscious milk flows from the udders of a conscious cow, the unconscious *Prakṛti* evolves for the sake of

conscious *Puruṣa* for its liberation. But flow of milk in the cow for the nourishment of the calf, a process which goes on only so long as there is a need for it (in the calf), is hardly a sufficient analogy, It is not a suitable illustration to explain the inherent unconscious teleology of *Prakṛti*. Grass changes into milk only when it is eaten by a milch cow and not when it is eaten by a bull. Moreover, the cow's instinctive love for her calf helps the flow of milk out of her udders The calf consciously draws milk from its mother's udders to satisfy its hunger. This argument would make *Puruṣa* active and *Prakṛti* intelligent. This analogy is a false one, since it is a matter of proof that the cow is a non-intelligent being. Nor is it of much use to appeal to the transformation of grass into milk in the body of the cow, for the transformation does not take place in the body of a dead cow or where grass is eaten by a bull. This would seem to indicate the necessity for some entity other than the material conditions of transformation, an entity that starts, direcis and controls the process.

The Sāṁkhya attempts to justify its unconscious teleology on the analogy of the magnet affecting the iron within its vicinity.[87] But this analogy does not help, for the magnet acts, not wherever it may be, but only in the presence of iron, and the proximity is, more often than not, intentionally brought about by an intelligent agent.

The Sāṁkhya[88] contends that just as a lame man guides a blind man, so also the intelligent *Puruṣa* in spite of being inactive, guides the unconscious *Prakṛti*. But the analogy of the lame man and the blind man is wholly inappropriate. The lame man is not inactive. He communicates his ideas through words to the blind man, and thus acts upon him and guides his movements. The blind man is not non-intelligent. He understands his orders and carries them out. It is seen that their joint activity, i.e., their mutual co-operation, can bring about an end which one of them cannot achieve independent of the other. Each of these (the blind man and the lame one) has definite purpose of his own (though the purpose may happen to be identical or the same), while none of them definitely controls the other. It is not clear in the Sāṁkhya teaching whether *Prakṛti* has any purpose of her own. The initiation and direction of evolution by a purely non-intelligent material principle would thus seem to be unacceptable and without any legitimate analogue in practice.

Puruṣa by itself or *Prakṛti* by itself is incapable of producing this world, a creation which is beneficial to both of them. The lame man cannot come out of the forest independently, nor can the blind man, himself perform this function. It is only when the two act together, that they can reach their goal. Pure consciousness is immutable and as such is incapable of producing anything by itself. *Prakṛti* is unconscious and as such is incapable of creating independently this meaningful world. The two must unite. *Prakṛti* must be vitalised by consciousness so as to be able to evolve this multi-coloured world.

Even if evolution could somehow start and maintain itself, it would serve no purpose. If it serves to release the *Puruṣa*, one wonders how the *Puruṣa* came to be bound at all. *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* would seem to have nothing in common except in respect of being un-originated. How then is it possible for the one to identify itself with the other ? If it is the *Puruṣa's* essential nature so as to identify itself, it can find no release except through its own destruction. If the identification is adventitious, the cause of the super-imposition should be sought, if either *Prakṛti* or the presence of *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti* be the cause, then, since these conditions persist at all times, even in release, there can be no assurance of its finality. The statement that *Puruṣa* having seen *Prakṛti* and *Prakṛti* having been seen by *Puruṣa*, they happen to live together, if at all, without mutual intercourse like a blase couple, is of no use except as a charming literary fancy.[89] The essential nature of *Puruṣa* is not such as to call for a necessary completion by the sight or enjoyment of *Prakṛti* and the enjoyment when it comes is, for ought we know, accidental. And there is no knowing when

such accidents will recur; one may predict on the basis of knowledge, not of ignorance. Bondage is inexplicable. Assuming that it has come about somehow, release is still more inexplicable.

There is still an unsolved mystery in the process of *Prakṛti*, in its evolution and involution. It is said that as soon as a *Puruṣa* realises its separateness (*kaivalya*), *Prakṛti* withdraws from it and withdraws its own evolutes into itself. But if it is an unconscious entity, how can it manifest its evolutes to some *Puruṣas* and not manifest them to others at one and the same time? Has it a mysterious power and a sense of discrimination? If it has them how can it be called unconscious? The Sāṁkhya[90] resorts to the simile of a dancing girl who withdraws from such men as are not interested in her blandishments. But how can *Prakṛti* which is unconscious and material and works in fixed ways, be as delicate, sensitive and prudent as a self-conscious dancing girl? The only reasonable way in which we can understand this view of the Sāṁkhya is that *Puruṣa* itself withdraws from *Prakṛti* like a bored spectator from all that takes place. But does it withdraw its reflection? It has not thrown itself into *Prakṛti* and the reflection is not it itself. Then, why should it bother about withdrawing its reflection? The sun is not worried about the vicissitudes of its reflections in water.

These are some of the diffculties which we witness in the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution (*pariṇāma*). The followers of the Sāṁkhya have taken pains to overcome them, but they continue to baffle and worry the thinking minds. The Yoga accepting God as an intelligent director of the process of evolution and involution overcomes the difficulties to a certain extent that the Sāṁkhya is beset with.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The word '*pariṇāma*' is derived from the root '*nam*', to bend or turn by adding the prefix '*pari*' and noun-formative suffix '*a*'. Thus, it means 'to bend', 'to change', 'to be transformed into'. Hence, the word '*pariṇāma*' derivatively means a change or transformation.

2. *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmānnivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti* | YB.ii.19.
3. YD, p.90.
4. The Nyāya designtes the material cause as the inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), since it constitutes the substratum for the effects to inhere in.
5. *pūrvabhāvitve dravyorekatarasya hānenyatarayogaḥ* | SPS.I.75,
6. SPV, SPB.I.75.
   Anima Sen Gupta, *Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study*, p.199.
7. *pariccinnaṁ na sarvopādānaṃ* | SPS.I.76.
8. *yadalpaṁ tanmartyaṃ* | CU.VII.24.I.
9. *pradhānājjāgajjayate* | Quoted in SPV.I.77
10. SPS.I.67.
11. SPV.I.67.
12. SPB.I.67.
13. *Ibid.*
14. TV.I.4.
15. *acetanatvepi kṣīratvatcceṣṭitam pradhānasya* | SPS.III.59
    vasta-vivṛddhi-nimittaṃ
    kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya |
    puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittaṃ
    tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya || SK.LVII
16. *puruṣasya darśanārtham*
    kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya |
    pangv-andhavad ubhayor
    api saṁyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ ||
17. *svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṁyogaḥ* | YS.II.23.
18. SPB.I.96.
19. SK. XXI.
20. P.T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, pp.310, 390.
21. SPB.VI.67.
22. *avivekanimitto vā pañcaśikhaḥ* | SPS.VI. 68
23. *Ibid.*III.12-16.
24. *bhavapratyayo videhaprakṛtilayānāṃ* | YS.I.19

25. *viśeṣaviśeṣaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni gunaparvāṇi* | YS.II.19
26. SPS.I.61.
27. *prakṛter mahāṁs tato'haṅkāras*
    tasmād gaṇas'ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ |
    tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt
    pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni || SK.XXII.
    See also Gerald James Larson, 'An Eccentric Ghost in the Machine: Formal and Quantitative Aspects of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga Dualism', PEW, Vol.XXXIII, No. 3, July, 1983, p. 231.
28. *sa tu deśamahatvāt kālamahatvātcca mahān* |
    sarvoptādhyebhyo mahāparimāṇayuktatvāt mahān || YD,p.108.
29. SK. x.
30. *adhyavasāyo buddhir*
    dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryam |
    sāttvikam etad-rūpam,
    tāmasam asmād viparyastam || SK.XXIII.
31. *buddhisattvam hi bhāsvaramākāśakalpam* | YB.I.36.
32. The are *yatamāna-saṁjñā*, non-attachment at the rudimentary level of willing to control all desires; *vyatireka-saṁjñā*, non-attachment advanced to the stage where some at least are controlled, while others yet distract the mind and delude the senses; *ekendriya-saṁjñā*, non-attachment when the senses are controlled, but the mind alone continues to long for this or that; *vāsikāra-saṁjñā*, non-attachment when desire completely ceases for the things whether of this world or of the other.
33. They are: (1) *aṇimā*, the capacity to penetrate all things like an atom; (2) *laghimā*, lightness which enables one to rise upon the rays of the sun; (3) *garimā*, extreme heaviness; (4) *mahimā*, extensive magnitude; (5) *prāptiḥ*, which enables one to touch the moon with one's finger tip; (6) *prākāṁyam*, obtaining all the objects of one's desire; (7) *vaśitvam*, subjugation of all elemental forces; (8) *yatra kāmāvasāyitvam,* infallibility of purpose, such as entertaining desires and purposes which come to be realised invariably.

34. J.A.B. Van Buitenen. 'Studies in Sāṁkhya—II', JAOS, Vol. LXXVII, 1957, 15 ff.
35. SK. XXIV.
36. '*Abhimāna*' is from the root, '*man*' the prefix '*abhit*' and may mean 'imagine', 'suppose'; and as masculine noun may mean 'self-conceit', 'pride', or 'erroneous conception'.
37. SPS.II.16.
38. SK. XXV.
39. SPS.II.18, SK.XXV.
40. SK.XXVII.
41. *Ibid*. XXXIII.
42. *Ibid*. XXVII.
43. SPS. V.71.
44. SPB. V.71.
45. 1. Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are called organs of cognition (*jñānendriyas*);
    2. Voice, hands, feet and the organs of excretion and generation are said to be the organs of action (*karmendriyas*) SK. XXVII.
46. *Ibid*. XXVI.
47. SPS. II.23.
48. SK. XXVIII.
49. *Ibid*. XXIX.
50. *Ibid*. XXXIII.
51. *Ibid*. XXXII.
52. *Ibid*. XXV.
53. *Ibid*. III.
54. SPS. III.1.
55. STK. XXXVIII.
56. *Ibid*. XXV.
57. SPB.II.18.
58. YD. p.22.
59. *prakāśakriyāsthitisīlaṁ bhūtendriyātmakaṁ*
    bhogāpavargārthaṁ dṛśyaṃ | YS.II.18.
    See YS., YB.II. 19.

60. YB.II.19.
61. TV.I.44.
62. YV.I.45.
63. For more details see Roma Ray, 'Is Pariṇāmavāda a Doctrine of Causality', IPQ, Vol.X, No. I, March, 1982, pp. 377-396.
64. STK. III.
65. S.N.Das Gupta, *Yoga as the Philososphy and Religion*, pp. 40-41.
66. YB.II. 19.
67. *yathā, samsthānam ādimat dharma mātraṁ śabdādīnām vināśi avināśīnāṃ*| YB.III.13.
68. M. Hiriyanna, *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, p.112.
69. The nature of *dharma-pariṇāma* is identical with the nature of '*pariṇāma*' as is obvious from Vyāsa's definition of parinama.
70. 'Production', if we are to use the causal language.
71. According to Sāṁkhya, there is no destruction in the sense of total annihilation; destruction only means disapearance from our sight or its lapsing into its manifest state.
72. *yathā puruṣa yekasyāṁ striyāṁ raktona śeṣasu virakto bhavatīti*| Y.B.III.13.
73. *lakṣaṇa pariṇāmo dharmaḥ adhvasu vartamānaḥ atītaḥ atītalakṣaṇayuktaḥ anāgata vartamānabhyaṁ lakṣaṇabhyaṁ aviyuktoḥ atīta anāgataḥ anāgatalakṣaṇayuktaḥ vartamānatītabhyaṁ lakṣaṇabhyaṁ aviyuktaḥ tathāvartamānaḥ vartamāna lakṣaṇayuktaḥ atītanāgatabhyam lakṣaṇabhyaṁ aviyukta iti* | Y.B.III.13.
74. Pulin Bihar Cakravarty, *Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, p.262.
75. *paramārthatastveka eva pariṇāmaḥ* | YB.III.13.
76. TV.III.13.
77. *tatra dharmasya dharmīṇi vartamānasyaivādvhasvatītanāgatavartamānesu bhavanyathatvaṁ bhavati na suvarṇanyathātvaṃ* | YB.III.13.
78. *dharmaśabdena dharmalakṣaṇavasthāḥ parigṛhyante* | TV.III.13.
79. *tadvārena dharmīṇa eva vikriyetyekā ca saṁkīrṇa ca* | *Ibid.*

80. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol.I, p.402.
81. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p.32.
82. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp.161, 165.
83. M.KV. Iyer, *Advaita Vedānta According to Śaṅkara*, p.104.
84. D.N. Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism*, pp.246, 247.
85. A.E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p.161.
86. SPS.III.58, SK. LVI.
87. SPB.I.96.
88. S.K. XXI.
89. *dṛṣṭā maye'ty upekṣaka*
ekaḥ, dṛṣṭā'ham ity uparamaty anyā |
sati saṁyoge' pi tayoḥ
prayojanam nā'sti sargasya | | SK.LXVI.
90. *nartakivat pravṛttasyapi nivṛttis' caritārtyāt* | SPS.III.69
raṅgasya darśayitvā
nivartate nartakī yathā nṛtyāt |
puruṣasya tathā 'tmānaṁ
prakāś-ya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ | | SK.LIX.

CHAPTER IV

Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda

4.1. ŚAṄKARA IN DEFENCE OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

Though the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and also of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta do subscribe to *satkāryavāda*, they differ in their explanation of the production of effects. While the Sāṁkhya-Yoga believes that production involves real change (*pariṇāma*) of the cause into effect, the followers of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta hold the view that production on ultimate analysis is only illusory (*vivarta*) and does not involve real change (*pariṇāma*).

Śaṅkara is as eloquent in his support of *satkāryavāda* and in his opposition to *asatkāryavāda* as the followers of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. He is in total agreement with the reasons offered by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in defence of the doctrine of pre-existent effects and its attack against the *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya.

Śaṅkara advances the following arguments in support of *satkāryavāda*[1] in addition to the arguments of Sāṁkhya which have presented already in Chapter II.

1. Śaṅkara seeks to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *asatkāryavāda* by attacking its category of inherence (*samavāya*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits a kind of rela-

tion called inherence (*samavāya-sambandha*) in which the related entities cannot be separated and this obtains between cause and effect, subtance and qualities, etc. Since the difference between cause and effect, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is based on the inseparable relation called *samavāya*, Śaṅkara attacks the concept of *samavāya* itself. Śaṅkara asks : 'What is the nature of the *samavāya* relation?' It cannot be identical with the terms it relates, since it is introduced on the principal that the two terms are really different. If A and B are different but bound together by a relation of inherence, which we propose to designate as C, then we cannot logically predicate C's identity with both A and B. If C is identical with A, it follows that it is non-identical with B. If C is identical with B, it follows that it is non-identical with A since A is non-identical with B. Therefore, the possibility of inherence being identical with the terms it relates is ruled out.

This confronts us with the problem of determining the connection between the relation of inherence to the things which it relates. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treats cause, effect and the relation of inherence by which they are related as independent reals. It should, therefore, posit an infinite series of inherence to relate cause and effect to each other. This infinite regress (*anāvasthā*) can be avoided, if essential identity (*tādātmya*) of the effect with its cause is admitted. If it were not admitted, cause and effect would be isolated from each other, and could not be related to each other. If it is argued that the relation of inherence does not lead to such a regress, by the provision that inherence itself has no relation with two terms of the relation, we are worse off, since the latter becomes disconnected and talk of relationship becomes meaningless.[2]

If it be held that *samavāya* being itself of the nature of a relation between cause and effect, it does not require another term to relate itself to cause and effect, then conjunction (*saṁyoga*) also being of the form of a relation can be related to the two terms related by it without the help of *samavāya* relation. But, this goes against the Nyāya view, according to which conjunction (*saṁyoga*) being a quality, resides in the two terms related by it by the *samavāya* relation. Moreover, says Śaṅkara, the assumption of the *samavāya* relation is unwarranted, since substance, qualities, etc. are understood to be identical.[3] Śaṅkara adduces another argument to refute the *samavāya* relation.[4] He asks: 'How does the effect-substance, which is a "whole" (*avayavin*) abide in the causal-substance which is in the form of parts (*avayavas*)? Does it reside in all the parts taken together or in each part separately?' If it be the former, we shall not be able to see the 'whole' because our visual organs are not in contact with all the parts. Manyness, residing in the substrates taken together, cannot indeed be apprehended by apprehending the parts individually.[5] If the 'whole' resides in the parts through a part to part relation,[6] even then we shall have to assume some parts of the 'whole' different from the original constituent parts, through which the 'whole' resides in the original constituent parts, in a part to part relation, as indeed, a sword pervades its sheath through parts which are different from the parts of the sheath. Śaṅkara observes that when a thing abides in another which is regarded as different from the first, the other things has different parts in which it abides in the parts of the first. A whole is regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a totally different entity over and above its parts. According to this logic, the whole must have parts of its own different from those of its parts. Now, again, in order to abide in

these parts different from the original parts, the 'whole' will require other parts different from them and so on which will lead to an infinite regress. If it is said that the whole abides in each particular part, that too will be inadmissible because, when the 'whole' is present in one part, it cannot be present in another, just as Devadatta, present in Srughna, cannot be present in Pātalīputra on that very day. If, at all, a 'whole' has to abide in many parts at the same time, there will be many 'wholes' not one, like two different persons Devadatta and Yājñadatta residing in Srughna and Pātalīputra. If it is said that the 'whole' can fully reside in each part, just as the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*) is fully present in each individual cow, that too is not admissible, says Śaṅkara, because the 'whole' is not seen as abiding in each part like the universal 'cowness' seen residing in each individual cow. Further, if the whole is fully present in each part, we will be confronted with another difficulty. As the 'whole' is one, it should produce effects in all the parts in which it abides. Thus, the cow should be able to perform the function of its udders by its horns and the function of its back by its chest. But, it is not seen so.[7] Thus, the whole theory of the *asatkāryavāda*, that the effect, in the form of the whole, abides in causal parts through *samavāya* relation, falls to the ground. Cause and effect must therefore, be accepted as non-different because they are seen to be so.

Śaṅkara does not recognise *samavāya* as a reality but considers it as an artificial construction of the intellect. He criticises it, since it has pluralistic and realistic implications. Inherence is a necessity in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to uphold its philosophy of pluralism and realism and it stands as a hurdle to philosophy of non-dualism for which Śaṅkara's system stands. Naturally, Śaṅkara is prone to attack it.

2. Śaṅkara raises another objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of non-existent effects on the basis of the relation between cause and effect. A relation is possible only between two existing entities, and not between an existing and a non-existing entity, or between two non-existing entities.[8] *Asatkāryavāda* involves the notion of the origination of the effect without a referent, i.e. without a basis. Action presupposes something which is active, just as the action of walking refers to an agent who walks. All activity necessarily involves some referent or other. We cannot conceive the notion of action without an agent. Śaṅkara alleges that *asatkāryavāda* warrants such an impossible situation. If we reject the doctrine of pre-existent effects, we cannot offer an intelligible explanation of the production of an effect such as a jar, for, since the jar itself does not exist at the moment prior to origination, something else must serve as the substratum of the originative act. This substratum cannot be the potter or his materials, since these are already existent prior to the origination of the jar. When we speak of the origination of the jar, we do not mean by this expression the origination of the potter or his materials.[9] If the *asatkāryavādin* were to recognise the necessity of a referent which is a requirement for an intelligible explanation of production, he has to concede the pre-existence of the jar in the form of its material cause, e.g., clay. By origination is meant (in this case) the modification of clay into the form of a jar.
3. The contention of the *asatkāryavādin*, that the effect is non-existent before origination, suggests a limit to the effect. But, it is absurd to assign a limit to the non-existent entity. The notion of a limit has meaning only with reference to real existing things such as fields and houses. Non-existence is destitute of features, which would serve to distinguish it from other things. Being literally nothing, it is an unreality and such an unreality cannot be spoken of as a limit.[10]
4. If the effect were non-existent in its cause, the activity of the agent wolud be objectless, since a non-entity cannot be its object.[11] Even the hundred strokes of a sword cannot cut the ether. The agent's action cannot be said to act on the material cause, since action on one thing cannot produce another thing. A potter cannot make a gold pot out of clay with a staff and a wheel. If the effect is said to be the specific power of the material cause itself, then it pre-exists in the cause before its production in this form.

The *asatkāryavādin* may seek to explain the specification of causes in a manner consistent with his theory, by saying that although the effects do not exist at all in their causes prior to their production, each such cause possesses a potency or power to produce its specific effect. Although effects as such on the *asatkāryavāda* view are equally non-existent everywhere before such production (e.g., the jar before its production no more exists in a lump of clay than in, say, a fruit), because such causes possess this potency to produce effects peculiar to themselves, we get certain effects from certain causes and not otherwise, e.g., curd from milk and not from clay, etc.

Śaṅkara subjects this notion of potency to some sharp criticism. If by it is actually meant an antecedent form of that which becomes the effect, then the *asatkāryavādin's* theory is by virtue of this admission discarded. Potency (*atiśaya*) is assumed by the *asatkāryavādin* in the present instance in order to avoid the charge that his doctrine leads to a conclusion which is at odds with what is observed in causal processes.[12] But, if this potency is other than both cause and effect, the same problem recurs which

it was intended to meet, since if the potentiality which is presumably resident within the cause is other than that which becomes the effect, the charge can still be made that there is no reason why a certain potency and not another should produce a particular effect. Obviously, unless one resorts to some theory of magical potency on the part of causes, the situation can only be made intelligible by a straightforward admission that such potentialities are in fact nothing other than the effects themselves before emergence.

5. The cause and effect are identical, says Śaṅkara, because only when the cause exists, the effect is observed to exist, not otherwise. This dependence is illustrated by the example of a jar, which cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e., clay) and the cloth, which cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e., yarn). Cause and effect moreover are implicated in each other in a way which exists among entities whose distinctness from each other is not in doubt. A horse, for example, is different from a cow and is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists, because in this case, though the relation between the two is that of cause and effect (*nimitta-naimittika*), they are different.[13] Therefore, the inseparability of cause and effect presents a case for their non-difference.

Śaṅkara also gives an illustration to substantiate his view. So long as a piece of cloth is rolled up, he says, we cannot know whether it is a cloth or something else. But, when the rolled thing is unfolded, we can see that it is nothing else but cloth. Moreover, when the cloth is rolled up, we though, sometimes, know that it is a cloth, do not know of what length and breadth it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars about it. As the unrolled cloth is only a manifested form of the rolled cloth, similarly, cause and effect are identical; the effect, e.g., a cloth is only a manifested form of the cause, namely, the yarn, the manifestation being done by the operation of the instrumental causes such as a shuttle, loom, weaver, etc.[14]

4.2. PARIṆĀMA LEADS TO VIVARTA

Although Śaṅkara totally agrees with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga line of thinking in defence of *satkāryavāda,* he considers that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is not correct in its interpretation of production as real.[15] The spirit of *satkāryavāda* that the effect is non-different from its material cause cannot be sustained on the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine that the production involves real change (*pariṇāma*). The Sāṁkhya-Yoga is perfectly right in its contention that the effect is non-different from its cause. But, it exhibits a poor understanding of the implications of *satkāryavāda,* when it claims that production involves real change. The followers of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta were fully aware of this inconsistency in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga interpretation of *satkāryavāda*. Interpretation of *satkāryavāda* as *pariṇāma*, while explaining the process of production, is defensible from the empirical point of view (*vyāvahārika*). But it is indefensible from the ultimate point of view (*pāramārthika*) as it does not cohere with the true purport of *satkāryavāda*. It is for this reason that Sarvajñātman, a follower of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta, considers that the *pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṁkhya is a prelude (*pūrvabhūmi*) to *vivartavāda*.[16] The Sāṁkhya is correct in its contention that the effect is non-different from its material cause, for otherwise, we cannot account for the restriction of certain effects to certain material causes. But, Sarvajñātman thinks that the Sāṁkhya is not aware of the implications of the doctrine of *satkārya* when it claims that production involves a real change (*pariṇāma*). True to the spirit of *satkāryavāda,* the Sāṁkhya contends that effect is not a different entity over and above its material cause but only a different state or form of its material cause. In conformity with this doctrine, production does not involve

the emergence of the new, but the disappearance of one form and the appearance of another in a substance that endures. When gold in the form of a chain is melted and transformed into bangles, there is no change in the gold-substance as such. The gold-substance remaining the same, its earlier from, namely, that of a chain, disappears and it acquires another form, namely, that of bangles. The question to be raised at this juncture is: whether the form (chain or bangles) is something different from its substance (gold). The Sāṁkhya, in tune with the spirit of *satkāryavāda,* contends that the form is non-different from its substance. Neither the chain nor bangles has a being of their own apart from the being of its substance, namely, gold. The form has no being of its own, it always belongs to its substance. It remains unmanifest before causal operation and becomes manifest after causal operation. On this assumption, production does not involve real change in as much as the effect is existentially identical with its cause. No new entity is produced in as much as effect which remains in the casue in an unmanifest form becomes manifest under causal operation. As we have stated already, production and destruction in Sāṁkhya resemble the tortoise stretching its limbs out of its shell and withdrawing the same into its shell respectively. Production is manifestation (*avirbhāva*) and destruction is envelopment (*tirobhāva*).

There is, however, a contradiction in the Sāṁkhya position in that though it accepts the identity of the effect with its material cause, it still believes that production involves real change. But, it cannot maintain the non-difference of the effect from its cause, if it insists that production involves real change (*pariṇāma*). The followers of Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta being aware of this contradiction in the Sāṁkhya doctrine of *pariṇāma* involving real change, aimed at correcting this error. Sarvajñātman, in his *Samkṣepa Śārīraka,*[17] rightly observes that if production involves real change, it is not possible to avoid the notion of the difference of the effect from its cause and hence the reality of the effect independent of its cause, however negligible it be. But the admission of the difference of the effect from its cause goes against the doctrine of *satkārya,*[18] according to which the effect is non-different from its material cause. Thus, consistency with the doctrine of *satkārya* does not permit the Sāṁkhya to accept the doctrine of real change (*pariṇāmavāda*). In other words, *pariṇāmavāda* does not cohere with *satkāryavāda*. The followers of the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta, being aware of this contradiction in the Sāṁkhya interpretation of *satkārya* as *pariṇāma*, do not subscribe to the doctrine of real change and interpretation *satkāryavāda* as involving only illusory change (*vivarta*).

Assuming that the effect is not a different entity over and above its cause, but only a different state or form of its material cause, the Advaitin asks whether the change of form affects the identity of the object. Śankara contends that causation involves a transition of object (cause) from one state to another. When clay (cause) is transformed into a pot (effect), here the change is only in form and not in the substance, for the clay in its causal state possesses the form of a lump and in its effect state acquires the form of a pot with a bottom and a belly. The pot is not a different substance over and above clay, it is only clay in a different form. The point to be noted here is, whether change in the form affects the identity of an object. The Advaitin answer that change of form does not affect the identity of an object which undergoes change. If form has an independent existence apart from its substance, then we are justified in upholding the reality of change and hence the reality of the effect. But deep reflection and analysis of the instances of the change of cause into an effect show us that form has no existence of its own independent of its substance. It owes its being to its substance. Thus, the effect being nothing but a particular form or state of the cause-substance, it can be said that when cause changes into an effect, it does not entail any change in its essential nature. The fact that we recognise objects even when they undergo change of state or form, affords ample evidence in support of the identity of an object even after it undergoes change

of form. Devadatta, when standing, has a particular form; when he sits, he brings his arms and legs close to his body, i.e., while sitting he has a different form. But he is recognised as the same Devadatta in spite of change in his form. If change in form were to involve change in the essential nature of a person or an object, his or its identity would not be possible. In so far as change in form does not lead to change in the essential nature of an object, Śaṅkara argues, causation which involves only change of form does not involve real change in the cause. The point is well illustrated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,[19] when it says, 'These modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification'. Śaṅkara reiterates the same in his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*.[20] Śaṅkara illustrates, how the Vaiśeṣika having accepted qualities or forms as independent reals gets into insurmountable difficulties to explain the relation between substance and its qualities. In order to relate two distinct reals such as a substance and its quality, Śaṅkara contends, we require a third entity, namely, inherence (*samavāya*). But the third entity also being different from the first two, it requires a fourth entity to get itself related to the first two. In this way it lands us in an infinite regress (*anavastha-doṣa*). Thus, there being no end to our supposition of entities, it will never be possible for us to explain satisfactorily the relation between the quality (form) and its substance (matter). And this absurdity is due to our supposition that qualities or forms have also distinct reality. The only way out of this is to deny distinct reality to qualities (form) and accept the fact that since they are non-different from their substance, change in form or quality does not involve real change in the substance. The effects, thus, being merely different forms of the abiding causal substance, do not stand for real modifications (*pariṇāma*) of the causes but only appearances (*vivarta*) of the causes.

One might contend that the Advaitin is unreasonable in dispensing with the reality of change and that his position contradicts what we perceive in our experience. But, the Advaitin argues that though the changes are obvious to our senses, they are logically untenable. For instance, we do perceive the movement of the sun, his rising and setting; we perceive the stick immersed in water to be bent; but we do not take them as real, since they are proved otherwise by reason. So is it with our experience of change of cause into an effect. Though they appear to be real to our senses, they are logically untenable. It is pertinent to note that the Parmanides in the west arrived at the unreality of change on similar grounds. Parmanides asks, if a thing changes, it must either remain the same even after change or it must be different. If it remains the same even after change, it means the thing has not really changed and if it is different, he asks, how can anything become different from itself? Since, the notion of change though obvious to our senses is unintelligible to our reason, Parmanides concluded that change is not real.[21]

The Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta dispenses with the doctrine of causation as such from the ultimate point of view, since it is riddled with contradictions. The *pariṇāmavādin* contends that the effect is identical with its cause whereas the *ārambhavādin* maintains that it is a totally different entity over and above its cause. But, if the effect is identical with the cause, there is no necessity for production, i.e., production is not real and hence there is no causation. If the effect is essentially different from its cause, the two being unrelated, there cannot be any production, for how can a thing produce something essentially different from itself. Hence, there is no causation. It is on this logic that Śaṅkara relegates the category of causation to the practical realm (*vyāvahārika*) and upholds the doctrine of illusory change (*vivarta*) from the point of view of ultimate reality (*pāramārthika-satta*).

Śaṅkara's interpretation of *satkārya* as *vivarta* is not only necessitated by logic and analysis of experience but also by the scriptural authority. Before we enquire into the scriptural evidences in

defence of *vivartavāda*, we propose to bring out the distinction between *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*. Vidyāraṇya observes, when an object attains a state which is different from its present one, it is known as real change (*pariṇāma*); but when an object merely appears to be of a different state, it is called transfiguration (*vivarta*),[22] change which is of the same grade of reality is transformation (*pariṇāma*), and change which is not of the same grade of reality is transfiguration (*vivarta*).[23] When milk changes into curd, we have an instance of *pariṇāma*; but when a rope appears as a snake, we have an example of *vivarta*. In the transformation of milk (cause) into curd (effect), the cause and the effect belong to the same order of reality. But in the transfiguration of a rope as a snake, the so-called cause (rope) and the effect (snake) belong to two different orders of reality.[24]

When the rope appears like a snake, it does not undergo any change and yet it stands as the substratum for the idea of a snake in the passerby. Despite its necessity for the appearance of the illusory snake, the rope cannot be considered as the cause for the snake, in the sense in which we consider the 'yarn' and the 'weaver' as the causes for the cloth. To be the cause of a snake, the rope must be either a material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) or an efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). The notion of material cause stands for the matter that undergoes change or transformation as when milk changes into curd. But, when the rope appears like a snake, the rope does not undergo any change at all. The rope remaining as rope gives rise to the idea of an illusory snake. Hence, the rope cannot be considered as the material cause. The concept of efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) suggests that principle which exercises effort to bring about changes in the material cause. But the rope cannot be considered as an efficient cause, since it does not exercise any effort to give rise to the illusion of a snake. Hence, the rope is neither a material cause nor an efficient cause. Yet, the fact is that in the absence of the rope we would not fall upon the idea of an illusory snake. Śaṅkara construes that it is more appropriate to consider the rope as the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for our experience of an illusory snake and not the cause because, the idea of a cause involves the notion of material causality or efficient causality and the rope is none of them. Yet, if there is no rope, there is no illusory snake-experience. But there would be a rope even in the absence of an illusory experience of a snake.

4.3. BRAHMAN TRANSCENDS CAUSALITY

Śaṅkara explains the relation between *Brahman* and the world[25] on the above lines, and his explanation is based on logic and scriptural authority. We have dealt with the former under the heading, how *pariṇāma* leads to *vivarta*. We propose to explain the latter here.

The scriptures declare that *Brahman* the reality is one,[26] that it is immutable and devoid of parts,[27] and that it is unborn, great and firm.[28] It is true that the world of plurality owes its existence to this one reality. If there is no *Brahman*, there is no world at all. Nevertheless, *Brahman* cannot be considered the cause of the world.[29] Because as we have seen already, to be a cause, it should be either a material cause or an efficient cause. But we cannot ascribe either material causality or efficient causality to *Brahman*. *Brahman* cannot be considered as the material or the transforming cause,[30] for being devoid of parts it cannot transform itself.[31] If *Brahman* were to undergo transformation, then either the whole or part of it would undergo transformation into the world. But, if the whole of *Brahman* were to change into the world, then it would lose its transcendence and we need not have to seek for it elsewhere. If a part of *Brahman* is supposed to change into the world, it means that it is divisible into parts. This goes against the scripture which declares that *Brahman* is devoid of parts.[32] Thus, the entire idea strikes one as absurd. Again, change is a sign of imperfection and deficiency. *Brahman* being perfect there is nothing for it to realise by changing. 'That which

is full and perfect, adequate and independent, absolute and free, cannot undergo any change or transformation'.[33]

It follows that *Brahman* cannot be a material cause. It cannot be considered as an efficient cause also. An efficient cause either creates the world out of nothing or produces it out of the existing material. We can not ascribe creation to *Brahman*, for creation involves a motive or a purpose, and motive and achievement of purpose are incompatible with the ultimacy of *Brahman*, which transcends all such motivation. Again, production of the world out of the existing material such as atoms, *Prakṛti*, souls, etc., is also repugnant to the ultimacy of *Brahman*. To posit some other realities like atoms, *Prakṛti*, souls, etc., side by side with *Brahman*, is to limit and finitise it and it goes against the scriptures which assert emphatically and unambiguously that reality is one. Further, the admission of some other reals different from *Brahman* conflicts with the scriptural assumption that the knowledge of the one results in the knowledge of the many.[34] If there are many reals which are different from one another, how can we justify the scriptural assertion that the knowledge of the one leads to the knowlege of the many. The above analysis leads to the conclusion that *Brahman* cannot be the cause of the world.

But, then, how are we to account for the existence of the world of diversity and change? What is the relation between *Brahman*, the immutable and the world which is mutable? The world cannot be said to be different from *Brahman*, for it contradicts the scriptural assertion which upholds the non-difference of the world from *Brahman*.[35] It cannot be identical with *Brahman* either, since identity is not possible between the sentient *Brahman* and the inert world. Nor can the world be said to be both different and non-different from *Brahman*, since two contradictory features like difference and non-difference cannot reside in one and the same substance. It is in view of such incompatible alternatives, that Śaṅkara upholds the idea of non-difference of the world from *Brahman*.[36] Non-difference, however, does not mean identity between them. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga also believes in the non-difference of the effect from its cause, and it means thereby identity. But the *vivartavāhin's* notion of non-difference of the effect (world) from its cause (*Brahman*) implies the denial of difference or separate being of the effect from its cause and not identity with the cause.

Vācaspati Miśra observes that the Advaitin merely denies the difference of the effect from its cause, but never affirms identity between them.[37] The effect has no reality apart from the reality of its cause. The world has only contingent existence and no intrinsic existence. It is only an appearance (*vivarta*) of *Brahman*. *Brahman* appears as the world even as the rope appears as the snake.[38] This suggests that *Brahman* and the world belong to two distinct orders of reality. The former is ultimately real (*pāramārthika-satta*) and the latter is only empirically real (*vyāvahārika-satta*). Causal relation is possible between one phenomenon and another or entities belonging to the same order of reality, but not between phenomena and noumena. Since, *vivartavāda* is the doctrine by which the Advaitin seeks to expain the relation between *Brahman* and the world which belong to two different orders of reality, it cannot be taken as a causal doctrine. Speaking from the ultimate point of view, the world has to be declared unreal. How can we conceive of any relation between the real and the unreal? Śaṅkara observes that the real can never have any relation with unreal.[39]

To explain it in another way : according to the doctrine of the causality of *Brahman*, *Brahman* is the cause and world its effect. So it is expected that *Brahman* and the world will be similar in nature. But are they actually so? They are not. *Brahman*, according to all descriptions, is sentient, ever pure, eternal and of the nature of knowledge and bliss, whereas the world is non-sentient, impure, changeable, of the nature of of ignorance, and full of misery and sorrow. How can there ever be any cause and effect relation between the two? This, in short, is the problem in respect of *Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda*.

The Advaitin offers a logical explanation and not a causal explanation for the appearance of the world besides *Brahman*. *Brahman* is not the cause of the world, but the 'because' (logical ground) of the world. The observations of N.K.Brahma go a long way in throwing light on this issue. He says, 'The cause is that which precedes the effect and effectuates its generation. But in this conception of the perfect and the full, the free and the independent ground, what is called the effect is always contained in the cause;[40] or truly speaking, there is not effectuation, no process of generation, no temporal relation, no antecedence or succession and hence there is neither any cause nor any effect'.[41] This is precisely the reason why the Advaitin cannot accept the ultimacy of the causal category.The category of causation, as in Kant, is empirically valid, but transcendentally an appearance. Causation is an instrument of thought, a principle of synthesis and not an ultimate reality. Though *Brahman* constitutes the ground of the entire world of causes and effects, it transcends that world and hence the principle of causation does not apply to it at all. *Brahman* transcends time, cause and every form of empirical characterisation. This is what the Advaitin means when he says that the notion of causation is phenomenal and therefore, has no ultimate significance.

Śaṅkara, however, has no objection to accept the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of real change (*pariṇāma*) from the point of view of the phenomenal world. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy stands for realism and it does not go as far as Advaita in relegating the world of plurality to the realm of appearance. Hence, it cannot accept *vivartavāda*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. SBS.II.i.14-20.
   See K. Max Nolan, 'Śaṅkara and the Casual Concept' (Part II), PB, Vol. LXXIII. No.2, Feb. 1968, pp.60-69.

   Also see B.G. Ketkar, 'An Examination of Śaṅkara's Theory of Causation', JPA, Vol.VII, No. 25, 26, Jan.-April, 1960, pp. 21-28.
2. *samavāyaḥ svayaṁ saṁbandha rūpatvāt anapekṣyaiva aparaṁ saṁbandhaṁ saṁbandhyate saṁyogapi tarhi svayaṁ saṁbandharūpatvāt anapekṣyaiva samavāyaṁ saṁbandhyeta* | SBS.II.i.18.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *na hi bahutvaṁ saṁsṭesvāśrayesu vartamānaṁvyastāśraya grahaṇena gṛhyate* | *Ibid.*
6. So that the 'whole' can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers. *Ibid.* Translated by Thibaut, Vol.I, p.336fn.
7. SBS. II.i.18.
8. *satorhi dvayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ saṁbhavati, nāsadāsatorasatorvā...* | *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *na hyaśvo goranyaḥ san gorbhāva evopalabhyate* | *na ca kulālabhāva eva ghaṭa upalabhyate, satyapi nimitta naimittika bhāve'nyatvāt* | *Ibid.* II.i.15.
14. *Ibid.* II.i.19.
15. For deails see Frank Podgorski, 'Śaṅkara's Critique of Sāṁkhyan Causality in the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya', PEW, Vol.XXV. No.i,Jan. 1975; pp. 49 ff.
16. *vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmiḥ*
    vedāntavade pariṇāmavādaḥ |
    vyavasthitesmin pariṇāmavāhde |
    svayam samāyati vivartavādah SS.II.61.

17. *vakyapravṛttimanusṛtya ca sūtrakāraḥ siddhātatāmanayadatra vivartavādam | tattvaprakāśanavidhāpahṛtya śaktim ārambhanādivacanāvaparapramayaḥ* || SS.II.56.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketye va satyam* || CU.VI.i.4.
20. SBS.II.i.4
21. B.G. Fuller, *A History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Vol.I.pp.61-62.
22. *Pañcadaśī*, XIII.6-9.
23. SLS.Vol.I, p.153.
    Ibid., Vol.II, p.13.
24. *pariṇāmonāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpattiḥ | vivartonāma upādānaviṣamasattākakāryāpattiḥ* | VP, pp. 39-40.
25. See Max Nalon, "*Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept*" (part I), PB, Vol. LXXII, Nov. 1967, pp. 467-468.
26. CU.VI.i.
27. VPS, p.204.
28. *virajaḥ para ākāśādaja ātmā mahān dhṛvaḥ* | BU.IV.iv.20.
29. See for details Dr. Roma Chaudhuri, 'An Objection Against Brahma-Kāraṇa-Vāda', PB, Vol. LXIX, Feb. 1964, pp.58-61.
30. For details see Max Nolan, 'Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept' (Part I), PB, Vol. LXXII, No.11, Nov.1967, pp.469-470.
31. VPS, p.204.
32. *niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyaṁ śāntaṁ niravadyaṁ nirañjanam* | SU. VI.19.
33. N.K. Brahma, *Causality and Science*, p.90.
34. CU.VI.i.4.
35. *Ibid.*
36. SBS.II.i.20
37. Bhāmatī.II.i.14.
38. SBS.II.i.9

39. Śaṅkara on Man.U.II.Vii.
40. It does not mean that the snake as such is (pre-figured) in the rope. It only means that the rope is never devoid of the possibility of giving rise to the snake-illusion.
41. N.K.Brahma, *Causality and Science*, p.77.

CHAPTER V

Critical Evaluation

I. A discerning student of the history of philosophy, East or West, finds a constant recurrence of basic problems and themes, despite differences in their formulations. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga theories of causation (*satkāryavāda*) and evolution (*pariṇāma*) are among such recurrent themes which need to be enquired into to assess their validity and efficacy.

The primary function of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, like other systems of Indian Philosophy, is to find a way out of *saṁsāra*, the three-fold pain (*trividha duḥkha*) and restore *Puruṣa* to its original condition of isolation from *Prakṛti*. This cannot be achieved in the absence of insight into the factors that bind *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti* and those which contribute to its release. It is in this context that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of evolution (*pariṇāma*) assumes importance. *Prakṛti* is supposed to bind *Puruṣa* through evolution and also provide an opportunity for its release. Hence, the need for a systematic study of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma*.

II. Though the term '*pariṇāma*' stands for any type of change (*sarūpa or virūpa*), according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, generally it is the evolution of heterogeneous categories starting from *mahat* that is called 'evolution' (*pariṇāma*). We need have no objection to call this process of *Prakṛti*, 'evolution' provided we do not confuse this use of the term with 'evolution' used in the context of the Darwinian or any other form of biological evolution. It should

be noted that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of evolution is a metaphysical theory par excellence. It is not like the biological theories of evolution, particularly Darwinian, for the simple reason that *Prakṛti* does not evolve like the forms of life that biological evolution speaks about, *Prakṛti* can scarcely struggle and evolve in any environment, since it itself is the environment. According to the Sāṁkhya, the process of evolution is indirectly initiated by *Puruṣa*, which thereby distinguishes it from naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*). According to Sāṁkhya, just as the bodily organism can be seen to contain design, so the Universe in its evolution exhibits a design. *Puruṣa* is the principle, for the liberation of which *Prakṛti* evolves. In other words, the activity of Nature (*Prakṛti*) is intended to serve the liberation of soul (*puruṣa*). Enjoyment (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) are *puruṣārthas*, and the conjunction of the *triguṇas* creates a ceaseless flow of modifications and complexities for the enjoyment and liberation of *Puruṣa*.

III. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of causation, termed as *satkāryavāda*, is a seminal feature of this system. It is based primarily on the principle that whatever is non-existent cannot be brought into existence and that whatever is existent cannot be made totally non-existent. The logical corollary that follows from this principle is that the effect is produced from the cause not totally dissimilar to it, as no interaction is possible between two absolutely distinct entities. It is true that these two tenets are not fully and explicitly stated in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. However, the whole trend of discussion on *satkāryavāda* does suggest these two principles as its basic underlying assumptions. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga uses the terms '*kāraṇa*' and '*kārya*' in a context which is quite different from the context in which such terms are usually employed in the discussions of causality in the Western philosophical tradition. In the context of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the cause in fact manifests the effect as its very self, the effect immediately showing it. Cause and effect are different in form but identical in essence. But, it should not be supposed that the form is alien to the cause.

The content and form of the effect are traceable to its material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*).

Thus, conversion and transformation of matter and energy from one form to another seems to be the basis of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *pariṇāma*. The effect is nothing but the cause, transformed and modified. Like causes always produce like effects, leaving absolutely no place for miracles. In this respect the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *satkāryavāda* comes very close to Aristotle's view, according to which causation is nothing but the transition from the potential being to the actual being. A similar idea is also discernible in Hegel who holds that causation is a passage from the implicit to the explicit. The notion of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga should, therefore, be viewed in terms of some dynamic transformation or operation by means of which a thing moves from its potential to its actual state. *Satkārya*, then, is rather a theory of implication than a theory of causation. According to *satkāryavāda*, the relation between the material cause and its effect resembles the logical relation of implication. In the relation of implication, the premisses imply the conclusion; the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Similarly, according to *satkāryavāda*, the effect necessarily follows from its material cause. The *satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya-Yoga resembles the entailment theory of causation in Western Philosophy.

The theory of *satkārya* is at the root of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *pariṇāma*. Creation (*sṛṣṭi*) is nothing but the process of transformation of the implicit into the explicit. *Ahaṁkāra* remains in an implicit state in the *mahat* and the *mahat* in its turn in *Prakṛti*. When the obstacles are removed, and the *guṇas* are thrown out of balance, *Prakṛti* changes into *mahat*, *mahat* into *ahaṁkāra* and so on. Although, *pariṇāmavāda* reveals to us a continuous process of becoming, yet at the root of it something eternal is clearly admitted and this eternal principle, though essentially mutative, is still the underlying support of all mutations and changes. Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force and change is merely the change of form and not the production of something new and unforeseen. This eternal dynamic principle is the same as *Prakṛti*—the name given to the complex of the three *guṇas*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

Just as *āraṁbhavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is an inevitable outcome of *asatkāryavāda*, *pariṇāmavāda* is an inevitable outcome of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of pre-existent effects (*satkāryavāda*). The effect, according to *āraṁbhavāda*, begins to be, having not existed before and hence, it is new. In fact it is totally a different entity over and above its material cause though it resides in it by means of a peculiar relation called inherence (*samavāya*). The commitments of *pariṇāmavāda* to the doctrine of pre-existent effects do not permit the effect to be new. But on the assumption of *āraṁbhavāda*, it is impossible to explain the law of universal causation. It does not rule out the possibility of anything being produced from everything and hence, we cannot account for the restriction of the production of certain effects to certain causes. On the other hand, if we can understand *pariṇāma* as the doctrine based on the necessary connection between cause and effect and not literally that the effect is pre-figured in its material cause, it will not only clear the mist surrounding the doctrine of pre-existent effects but also offer an intelligible explanation for the law of universal causation.

IV. Within the scope of the world of experience (*vyāvahārika*), the *pariṇāma* view of causation received acceptance in Śaṅkara's philosophy, but it is subordinated from the standpoint of *pāramārthika* to the doctrine of apparent change (*vivartavāda*).

Śaṅkara, who was convinced that the *niṣprapañca* view as standing for the ultimate teachings of the Hindu Scriptures, *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, had the problem of reconciling this with other notions expressed in some scriptures of the *saprapañca* variety. He sought to resolve this problem through the application of his distinction between the statements of *Śruti* concerned with *pāramārthika*. The *saprapañca* aspect of *Brahman*, while appearing real enough

within the context of empirical experience, was but an appearance from the ultimate point of view, i.e., from the *nisprapañca* position. In this connection, it is important to remember Thibaut's observation that by this adroit method Śaṅkara was able to do real justice to the complex totality of *Upaniṣadic* teaching better than other commentators such as Rāmānuja.

Śaṅkara is well aware of the scriptures in which the relation between *Brahman* and the world is developed along the lines of *pariṇāma*. But, this has to be viewed purely as a tentative measure, true from an empirical point of view, *vivarta* being true from the ultimate point of view. It is a matter of our experience that any discussion begins from the level of common thought and evolves itself into more and more abstract levels of cognition. In this psychological sense even the staunch critics of Śaṅkara might view as intelligible the dual use of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* modes of causality in the context of the relation between *Brahman* and the world.

Thus, while the *pariṇāma* relation obtains between *Brahman* and the world on the empirical level, the *vivarta* relation holds between them on the ultimate plane. In fact, the Advaitin dispenses with the category of causality as such from the ultimate point of view. For, while causal relations are a legitimate subject of discourse within the context of the world order, we cannot properly speak of a causal relation between entities belonging to different orders, namely, *Brahman*, the ultimately real and the world, the modification. It is merely an appearance (*vivarta*) of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is the ground (*adhisṭhāna*) of world-appearance and not its cause. We have already seen the reasons for the Advaitin's rejection of *pariṇāma* as reflecting the true purport of satkāryavāda and how *pariṇāma* is not compatible with *satkāryavāda*. But the Sāṁkhya-Yoga has no commitment to the philosophy based on the lines of distinction between *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* made by the Advaitin, who built this philosophy on considerations of experience and reason and they have convinced thus of *satkāryavāda* and *pariṇāmavāda*.

If we can understand the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *satkārya* as standing for the notion of necessary connection of effect to its cause and not its actual existence before its production, then the mist surrounding the doctrine of *satkārya* slowly disappears and we begin to see the meaning in it. *Pariṇāmavāda* as standing for the development of the effect from its implicit to its explicit state also becomes more meaningful and the weakness of the doctrine of *asatkārya* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is at once realised. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *pariṇāma* not only offers an intelligible explanation of the law of universal causation, but also a convincing explanation of the conception of 'change'.

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